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Draft White Paper on National
Defence for the Republic of South Africa
Defence in a Democracy
1995
Table of Contents
PREFACE
- CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
- * Aim and Scope
- * Process
- CHAPTER 2: CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION
- * National Security Policy and the RDP
- * Defence in a Democracy
- * International Law and Conflict
- CHAPTER 3: CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
- * Constitutional Provisions
- * Authority and Powers
- * Military Intelligence
- * Minister of Defence and Department of
Defence
- * Military Professionalism
- * Responsibilities of the Government
- * Rights of Soldiers
- CHAPTER 4: STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
- * External Context
- * Regional Security
- * Domestic Context
- CHAPTER 5: ROLE AND FUNCTIONS
- * Constitutional Provisions
- * Self-Defence
- * Deployment in Co-operation with the SA
Police Service
- * International Peace Operations
- * Other Defence Functions
- CHAPTER 6: HUMAN RESOURCE ISSUES
- * Integration
- * All-Volunteer Force
- * Part-Time Force
- * Demobilisation and Rationalisation
- * Equal Opportunity and Affirmative
Action
- * Defence Labour Relations
- CHAPTER 7: BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS
- CHAPTER 8: ARMS CONTROL AND ARMS INDUSTRY
- COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS SHEET
Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
- This Draft White Paper has been prepared in the spirit of
the new democratic era in South Africa. It acknowledges, as its point of departure, the
profound political and strategic consequences of the ending of apartheid.
- Following free and fair elections in April 1994, South
Africa has become a vibrant democracy. It has an
Interim Constitution which
outlaws discrimination, enshrines fundamental rights, and emphasises openness and
accountability in governance.
- The Constitution also establishes a framework for democratic
civil-military relations. In terms of this framework the Defence Force is non-partisan; it
is subject to the control and oversight of the elected civilian authority; and it is
obliged to perform its functions in accordance with law.
- After two and a half decades of isolation, South Africa has
been welcomed back into the international community and has joined a host of important
regional and international bodies. The country's foreign relations have been transformed
from an adversarial mode to bilateral and multi-lateral co-operation.
- This fundamental shift has been accompanied by a dramatic
change in the strategic environment at domestic and regional levels. While instability and
conflict remain prevalent, the government is no longer at war with its own people and with
neighbouring states in Southern Africa.
- The government regards the daunting task of addressing
poverty and the socio-economic inequalities of apartheid as a priority. The
Reconstruction and Development
Programme (RDP) consequently stands at the pinnacle of national policy.
- The government is equally committed to national
reconciliation and unity. One of the most dramatic illustrations of this commitment is the
integration of former government, homeland and guerrilla forces into the South African
National Defence Force (SANDF).
- The Draft White Paper addresses the implications of these
momentous developments for defence policy and the SANDF.
[ Top ]
AIM AND SCOPE
- The aim of the Draft White Paper is to present proposals on
new defence policy on behalf of government and for the consideration of Parliament and the
public.
- The paper also provides a basis for informing other states,
particularly those in Africa and Southern Africa, of South Africa's emerging defence
policy. The paper may therefore serve as a confidence-building measure in the region.
- Defence policy can be described as that subset of government
policy which is concerned with countering military threats and with the orientation,
development, maintenance, preparation and employment of armed forces. Defence policy
should be in harmony with all other aspects of government policy, particularly foreign
policy and national security policy.
- The Draft White Paper considers the following topics:
12.1 The overarching challenge of transforming defence policy and
the armed forces in the context of the Interim Constitution; national security policy and
the RDP; and international law on armed conflict.
12.2 Civil-military relations, with reference to the
constitutional provisions on defence; military intelligence; the structure of the Ministry
of Defence (MOD) and Department of Defence (DOD); military professionalism; the
govern-ment's responsibility towards the SANDF; and the rights of soldiers.
12.3 The external and internal strategic environment and
the importance of promoting regional security.
12.4 The primary mission and secondary functions of the
Defence Force.
12.5 Human resource issues, including integration; the
establishment of an all-volunteer force; the Part-Time Force; rationalisation and
demobilisation; equal opportunity and affirmative action; and defence labour relations.
12.6 Budgetary considerations.
12.7 Arms control and the arms industry.
PROCESS
- Defence policy is no longer the preserve of an elite group
of 'securocrats'. On the contrary, the Draft White Paper is an invitation to citizens and
their elected representatives to engage in debate on military matters and, to the greatest
extent possible, forge a national consensus on defence.
- There are several reasons for this shift in emphasis. First,
accountability, responsiveness and openness in government are now constitutional
principles. Second, the SANDF is a national institution which relies on public support and
public funds to fulfil its mandate. Third, the functions and orientation of the Defence
Force are necessarily matters of great public interest.
- Once Parliament, the public and other government departments
have commented on this draft document, the Ministry of Defence will produce a White Paper
on Defence.
- The White Paper will serve as the policy framework for a
Defence Review which entails comprehensive long-range planning on such matters as
doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, armaments, equipment and funding. The DOD
will shortly begin the process of conducting the Review. The process will entail
widespread consultation, and the final product will be presented to Parliament by 1 April
1996.
- In addition, the DOD will periodically submit to Parliament
detailed plans on issues like demobilisation, rationalisation, equal opportunity, military
education, weapons acquisition programmes and the Part-Time Force.
- Finally, it should be noted that this Draft White Paper
draws extensively from the Interim Constitution. Certain adjustments to defence policy may
be necessary when the final Constitution has been promulgated.
[ Top ]
Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of
South Africa
Chapter 2
THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND THE RDP
- The goal of security policy under apartheid was to maintain
the system of minority rule against domestic resistance and international pressure. This
goal was pursued through extensive use of military and police force. Society became highly
militarised as the Defence Force was drawn into all spheres of life and the defence budget
imposed an increasingly heavy burden.
- A fundamentally different approach is required in a
democracy and the prevailing South African situation. Security policy is no longer a
predominantly military problem but has been broadened to incorporate political, economic,
social and environmental matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern
with the security of people.
- Security is an all-encompassing condition in which
individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of
governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the
basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their
health and well-being.
- At domestic level the objectives of security policy
therefore encompass the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice,
economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of
crime, violence and political instability.
- At international level the objectives include the
maintenance of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the
state Chapter 5
,
and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa
Chapter 4
.
- The
Government
of National Unity recognises that the greatest threats to the South African people are
crime, violence and socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education,
the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services.
- One of the government's policy priorities is accordingly the
Reconstruction and Development Programme. The RDP is the principal long-term means of
promoting the security of citizens and, thereby, the stability of the country.
- There is consequently a compelling need to reallocate state
resources to the RDP. From the perspective of the MOD, the challenge is to rationalise the
Defence Force and contain military spending without undermining the country's core defence
capability in the short- to long-term
Chapter 5
.
- The new approach to security does not imply an expansive
role for the armed forces. The SANDF will continue to be deployed in co-operation with the
South African Police Service, and it may be employed for socio-economic and other
secondary purposes, but its primary and essential mission is the conventional function of
defence against external military aggression
Chapter 5
.
- The Defence Force therefore remains an important security
instrument of last resort but it is no longer the dominant security institution. The
responsibility for ensuring the security of South Africa's people is now shared by many
government departments and ultimately vests in Parliament.
[ Top ]
DEFENCE IN A DEMOCRACY
- The theme of this Draft White Paper is the transformation of
defence policy and the Defence Force. Transformation is essential in the light of three
sets of factors: the history of armed forces in this country; the new strategic
environment at regional and domestic levels; and, most importantly, the advent of
democracy.
- The process of transformation will be guided by the
following principles of `defence in a democracy'. These principles are derived from the
Interim Constitution and government policy.
12.1
National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political,
economic, social and cultural rights and needs of South Africa's people.
12.2 South Africa shall pursue peaceful relations with
other states. It will seek a high level of political, economic and military co-operation
with Southern African states in particular.
12.3 South Africa shall adhere to international law on
armed conflict.
12.4 The SANDF shall have a primarily defensive orientation
and posture.
12.5 South Africa is committed to the international cause
of arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek to strengthen,
international and regional efforts to contain the proliferation of small arms,
conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.
12.6 South Africa's force levels, armaments and military
expenditure shall be determined by defence policy which derives from an analysis of the
external and internal security environment and takes account of the RDP imperative.
12.7 The SANDF shall be a balanced, modern and
technologically advanced military force, capable of executing its tasks effectively and
efficiently.
12.8 The functions and responsibilities of the SANDF shall
be determined by the Constitution and a revised Defence Act.
12.9 The primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South
Africa against external military aggression. Deployment in an internal policing capacity
shall be limited to exceptional circumstances and subject to parliamentary safeguards.
12.10 The SANDF shall be subordinate to the elected
civilian authority. It shall be fully accountable to Parliament and the Executive.
12.11 The SANDF shall operate strictly within the
parameters of the Constitution and domestic legislation. It shall respect human rights and
the democratic political process.
12.12 Defence policy and military activities shall be
sufficiently transparent to enable meaningful parliamentary and public scrutiny and
debate.
12.13 The SANDF shall be non-partisan with respect to
political parties.
12.14 The SANDF shall endeavour to develop a non-racial,
non-sexist and non-discriminatory institutional culture.
12.15 The SANDF shall respect the rights and dignity of its
members within the normal constraints of military discipline and training.
- The policy principles outlined above are explored in more
detail in the following chapters. The implications for the doctrine, posture and structure
of the SANDF will be dealt with in the Defence Review.
[ Top ]
INTERNATIONAL LAW ON ARMED CONFLICT
- The Interim Constitution contains three clauses which deal
with the military aspects of international law: soldiers may refuse to obey orders in
breach of this law; the SANDF shall not contravene the law on aggression; and in
situations of armed conflict, the Defence Force shall comply with its obligations under
international law and treaties.
- These clauses reflect the conviction of Parliament and the
Executive that South Africa should conduct its foreign policy as a responsible member of
the international community.
- There are two main categories of international law on armed
conflict: the `law against war' which relates to aggression and the right to resort to
force; and the `law in war', also referred to as international humanitarian law, which
governs the conduct of hostilities.
- The main rule of the law against war is contained in Article
2(4) of the United Nations
Charter:
"All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations".
- There are three legitimate exceptions to this substantive
ban on force in international relations:
18.1
Article 42 of the Charter authorises the collective use of force under the auspices of the
UN Security Council.
18.2 Article 53 permits the Security Council to mandate
regional organisations to take enforcement action in certain circumstances.
18.3 Article 51 preserves the inherent right of individual
or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations.
- Article 2(4) of the Charter stipulates the following
positive obligation:
"All Members shall settle
their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace
and security, and justice, are not endangered".
- International humanitarian law is contained chiefly in the
Hague Conventions and the
Geneva Conventions
and Protocols. These treaties seek to regulate the conduct of armed conflict with
reference to humanitarian concerns.
- In summary, the treaties outlaw attacks on non-military
targets; impose a duty to protect the victims of armed hostilities; prohibit certain
methods of warfare; and contain restrictions and absolute prohibitions on specific
categories of arms (eg chemical and biological weapons).
- International law on armed conflict will enjoy primary
consideration in the preparation and execution of military operations. It will
consequently be necessary to instruct SANDF personnel, particularly at leadership level,
on the relevant provisions of this law
Chapter 3
.
[ Top ]
Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of
South Africa
Chapter 3
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
- The
Interim Constitution outlines
the principles, structures, responsibilities and relationships which are necessary to
secure democratic civil-military relations. (Civil-military relations refer to the
distribution of power and influence between the armed services and the civilian
authority).
- The Constitution contains the following provisions in this
regard:
2.1 The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of the SANDF [Article 82(4.(a.].
2.2 The President may, with the approval of Parliament,
declare a state of national defence [Article 82(4.(b.(i.].
2.3 The President may employ the SANDF in accordance with
its functions and subject to the accountability outlined below [Article 82(4.(b.(ii.].
2.4 The President shall immediately inform Parliament of
the reasons for the employment of the SANDF where this relates to the defence of the
Republic, compliance with international obligations or the maintenance of internal law and
order [Article 228(4.(a.].
2.5 Parliament may resolve to terminate such employment
[Article 228(5.].
2.6 The President shall appoint the Chief of the SANDF
[Article 225].
2.7 The Chief of the SANDF shall exercise military
executive command of the armed forces subject to the directions of the Minister of Defence
and, during a state of national defence, the President [Article 225].
2.8 An Act of Parliament shall provide for the
establishment, organisation, training, conditions of service and other matters concerning
the permanent force and the part-time reserve [Articles 226(2. and (3.].
2.9 The Minister of Defence shall be accountable to
Parliament for the SANDF [Article 228(1.].
2.10 Parliament shall annually approve the defence budget
[Article 228(2.].
2.11 A joint standing committee on defence shall be
established in Parliament. The committee shall be competent to investigate and make
recommendations on the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale and
state of preparedness of the SANDF, and to perform such other functions related to
parliamentary supervision of the force as may be prescribed by law [[Articles 228(3.(a.
and (d.].
2.12 The SANDF shall perform its functions and exercise its
powers solely in the national interest by i. upholding the Constitution; ii. providing for
the defence of the Republic; and iii. ensuring the protection of the inhabitants of the
Republic [Article 227(2.(a.].
2.13 The SANDF shall perform its functions and exercise its
powers under the directions of the government and in accordance with the Constitution and
any law [Articles 227(2.(a. and (b.].
2.14 The SANDF shall conform to international law on armed
conflict which is binding on South Africa [Articles 227(2.(d. and (e.].
2.15 The SANDF shall refrain from furthering or prejudicing
any party political interest, and no member of the permanent force shall hold office in
any political party or organisation [Articles 227(2.(c. and 226(6.].
[ Top ]
AUTHORITY AND POWERS
- The Interim Constitution outlines a clear hierarchy of
authority on defence matters: the Chief of the SANDF enjoys executive military command of
the armed forces; this authority is exercised under the direction of the Minister of
Defence in times of peace and the President during a state of national defence; and the
Minister is in turn accountable to Parliament for the SANDF.
- Parliament has a range of significant powers regarding
military affairs. These powers include investigation, recommendation and supervision;
approval of defence legislation and the defence budget; and review of the President's
decisions to deploy the SANDF in critical functions.
- The DOD respects the right and duty of Parliament to
exercise independent and critical judgement on defence policy and practice.
- Nevertheless, the DOD looks forward to building a close and
co-operative relationship with the parliamentary defence committees. To this end, the
Department will engage in on-going communication with the committees in order to convey
information and elicit comment.
- Parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate will only be
meaningful if there is sufficient transparency on military matters. Although a measure of
secrecy will undoubtedly be necessary, the governing constitutional principle is 'freedom
of information'. Exceptions to this principle should be limited and specific, and will be
dealt with in legislation.
- The MOD supports the creation of the post of Military
Ombudsperson whose main duty is to investigate complaints against the SANDF by military
personnel and members of the public. The ombudsperson would be an independent official who
is appointed by, and reports to, Parliament. A number of parties have made proposals in
this regard to the Constitutional Assembly.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
- The principles of civil-military relations have special
relevance to military intelligence given its controversial history in South Africa. The
RSA Intelligence
White Paper and the intelligence legislation which has been promulgated emphasise the
themes of an ethical code of conduct, the rule of law, parliamentary oversight and
executive control in respect of the various intelligence agencies.
- The Intelligence Division of the SANDF is also subject to
the scrutiny of the Inspector General of the force and the co-ordinating mechanisms
provided for in new intelligence legislation.
- The Ministry will ensure that a fair and acceptable balance
is reached between the need to protect sensitive information and the demands for freedom
of information in respect of intelligence activities.
- The main functions of the Division are counter-intelligence
and the gathering and analysis of external military information. The primary aim of the
latter function is to provide the SANDF with advance warning of potential military
threats, and thereby with maximum time for defence preparation. An effective intelligence
capability is essential if force levels are to be kept to the lowest practical level in
times of peace.
- In co-operation with the national intelligence co-ordinating
structures, the Ministry will seek to establish arrangements for sharing intelligence with
other countries in order to facilitate continuous monitoring and evaluation of changes in
the strategic environment. Southern African countries are a priority in this regard.
- As a general rule, the Division is not permitted to collect
domestic military intelligence in a covert manner. However, where the SANDF is deployed
internally in support of the police, the National Strategic Intelligence Act provides that
the President may authorise the Division to engage in such collection in a specified
geographical area for a specified duration.
MINISTER OF DEFENCE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE
During the apartheid era the Department of Defence was
militarised by proclamation of the State President, with most of its functions being
performed by SADF Headquarters.
- In the interests of entrenching democratic civil-military
relations, the President has issued a proclamation providing for the creation of a new
Department which incorporates the SANDF and includes a civilian Defence Secretariat.
- The Minister of Defence is the political head of the DOD.
The Chief of the SANDF is the departmental head who directs the work of Defence
Headquarters. The Defence Secretary is the principal accounting officer who manages the
duties of the Secretariat.
- The Chief of the SANDF and the Defence Secretary have equal
status under the Minister. They are co-chairpersons of the statutory Defence Staff Council
which has advisory powers. They also serve on the statutory Council of Defence which is
chaired by the Minister.
- The Ministry of Defence is comprised of the Minister, the
Deputy Minister and their personal staff. The Minister and Deputy Minister constitute the
civilian authority on military matters on behalf of the Executive. The Minister is
accountable to Parliament for the defence function of government.
- In determining the respective functions of the Secretariat
and Defence Headquarters, there are two basic guidelines: civilians formulate defence
policy and the military executes this policy; and civilians are responsible for the
political dimensions of defence. This breakdown does not preclude senior officers from
being seconded to work in the Secretariat on the basis of their functional expertise.
- It is the goal of the Minister to staff the Secretariat
predominantly with civilians. As a transitional arrangement, however, the Secretariat will
initially be comprised largely of officers transferred from Defence Headquarters in order
to ensure continuity.
[ Top ]
MILITARY
PROFESSIONALISM
- Stable civil-military relations depend to a great extent on
the professionalism of the armed forces. The challenge is to define and promote an
approach to military professionalism which is consistent with democracy and the
Constitution.
- More specifically, the desired professionalism of the
full-time and part-time components of the SANDF includes the following political, ethical
and organisational features:
22.1 The acceptance by
military personnel of the primacy of civilian rule.
22.2 The maintenance of technical, managerial and
organisational skills and resources which enable the armed forces to perform their primary
mission and secondary functions efficiently and effectively.
22.3 Strict adherence to the Constitution, domestic
legislation and international law.
22.4 Respect for the democratic political process, human
rights and cultural diversity.
22.5. The operation of the Defence Force according to
established policies, procedures and rules in times of war and peace.
22.6 A commitment to public service, chiefly in defence of
the state and its citizens.
22.7 Non-partisanship in relation to party politics.
- Education and training programmes within the SANDF are a
cardinal means of building and maintaining a high level of professionalism. In this regard
the Interim Constitution provides that all members of the SANDF "shall be properly
trained in order to comply with international standards of competency" [Article 226
(5)].
- At the heart of training is the preparation of officers and
other ranks to fulfil the SANDF's primary mission of defence against external military
aggression.
- In addition, special training programmes are required to
standardise procedures following the integration of armies; to facilitate an equal
opportunity programme and upgrade the skills of black soldiers
Chapter 6
; to meet
the particular needs of an all-volunteer force
Chapter 6
; and to
prepare for involvement in international peace operations
Chapter 5
.
- Training will also play an essential role in developing the
political and ethical dimensions of military professionalism. To this end, the Ministry
will oversee the design and implementation of a programme on 'defence in a democracy'.
- The programme will cover the following subjects: the key
elements of the political process in a democracy; the constitutional provisions on
fundamental rights and defence; the significance of the Constitution as the highest law of
the country; international law on armed conflict; and respect for multi-cultural
diversity.
- This programme will extend to all members of the SANDF but
will necessarily be tailored according to function and rank. It will encompass short-term
orientation courses and a longer term process of adapting the development programmes of
Officers and Warrant Officers/Non-Commissioned Officers.
- The programme will be integrated into all aspects of
training rather than treated as an isolated subject. It will be applied to the military
context through lectures, simulated exercises and case studies.
- The MOD recognises that the programme will have little value
if misconduct is any way sanctioned by the military or civilian authority. The
institutional culture of the SANDF will only be infused with respect for human rights and
the rule of law if its members are subject to disciplinary action in the event of abuses.
- The DOD is currently undertaking a review of the Military
Disciplinary Code in the light of the Interim Constitution and emerging defence policy.
- Members of the SANDF, especially senior officers and
instructors who train military personnel, are already being exposed to international law
on armed conflict under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross and
the International Institute of Humanitarian Law.
[ Top ]
RESPONSIBILITIES OF GOVERNMENT
- The Interim Constitution, as with other democratic
constitutions, seeks to establish stable civil-military relations by subjecting the
Defence Force to civilian control. Such control is deemed vital because armed forces
typically have a substantial capacity for organised violence.
- However, the government recognises that civil-military
relations will only be stable if the requisite control is accompanied by the fulfillment
of certain responsibilities towards the Defence Force and its members. These
responsibilities include the following:
34.1 The
government will not misuse the SANDF for partisan or repressive purposes.
34.2 The government will not interfere in the military
chain of command or intrude on operational matters which are the authority of military
commanders. However, the government will supervise and exercise control over operations
and preparations for operations through the Chief of the SANDF.
34.3 The government will take account of the professional
views of senior officers in the process of policy formulation and decision-making on
defence. This input is assured through the Defence Staff Council, the Council of Defence
and the structure of the DOD.
34.4 The requirement that soldiers operate within the law
presupposes that government acts in a lawful fashion.
34.5 The government will request from Parliament sufficient
funds to enable the SANDF to perform its tasks effectively and efficiently.
34.6 The government will seek to ensure that military
personnel are adequately remunerated, and will provide the necessary support to retired
and demobilised soldiers.
34.7 The government will not endanger the lives of military
personnel through improper deployment or the provision of inadequate or inferior weapons
and equipment.
RIGHTS OF SOLDIERS
- Members of the SANDF are citizens and therefore enjoy the
same fundamental rights as civilians. Certain exceptions to this principle will be
necessary because of the unique nature of military service. The exceptions will be limited
and specific, and will be covered in defence legislation.
- The exceptions will also be subject to the constitutional
provisions on limitation of fundamental rights. Such limitations are only permissible if
they are reasonable, justifiable in an open and democratic society, and do not negate the
essential content of the right in question.
- Military personnel are entitled to vote and to be members of
the political party of their choice. However, as noted above, the Interim Constitution
provides that no member of the Permanent Force shall hold office in any political party or
political organisation.
- The Interim Constitution further provides that a member of
the SANDF `shall be obliged to comply with all lawful orders but shall be entitled to
refuse to execute any order if the execution of such order would constitute an offence or
would breach international law on armed conflict binding on the Republic' [Article 226
(7)].
This provision will be applied strictly and
its implications for military operations will be conveyed to all soldiers and officers in
the course of their training and education. The question of international law on armed
conflict is covered below.
[ Top ]
Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of
South Africa
Chapter 4
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
EXTERNAL CONTEXT
- The aim of this Section is to identify those prominent
trends which have major implications for the defence sector. For political, historical and
geographic reasons, the emphasis lies mainly on the Southern African region.
- The ending of apartheid has given rise to dramatic changes
in the external strategic environment from the perspective of South Africa. The country is
no longer regarded as a pariah state but has been welcomed into many international
organisations, mo st importantly the United Nations (UN),
the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community
(SADC).
- South Africa is in fact expected to play a leadership role
in these forums, especially with regard to peace and security in Africa and Southern
Africa. In particular, there are expectations that South Africa will become involved in
international peac e operations on the continent and sub-continent.
- The most significant strategic development over the past few
years is South Africa's new status in Southern Africa, previously an arena of intense
conflict. With the election of the Government of National Unity, relations with
neighbouring states cha nged instantly from suspicion and animosity to friendship and
co-operation.
- The region as a whole has undergone substantial change since
the end of the Cold War. Considerable progress has been made towards the resolution of
internal conflicts, the establishment of democracy, and demilitarisation and disarmament.
The prospec ts for regional peace and stability are greater today than at any other time
in recent decades.
- Nevertheless, much of the sub-continent is stricken by
chronic underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and
unemployment. There are large numbers of refugees and displaced people; an acute debt
crisis; and rampant disease an d environmental degradation. Certain states remain
politically volatile. The worst case scenario, as experienced most intensely in Angola and
Mozambique, is civil war.
- These phenomena are not confined to national borders. They
impact negatively on neighbouring states in the form of a range of non-military threats:
environmental destruction, the spread of disease, the burden of refugees, and cross-border
trafficking in drugs, stolen goods and small arms.
- South Africa is not confronted by an immediate conventional
military threat. It has no aggressive intentions towards any state and does not anticipate
external military aggression in the short term (+/- 5 years).
- The longer term future cannot be determined with any degree
of certainty because international relations are unpredictable. They are characterised by
conflicting national interests and competition around trade and natural resources. There
is the ris k of armed hostilities in some parts of the world, and a high level of
political cohesion in others.
- Since the end of the Cold War there have been simultaneous
tendencies towards the formation of regional blocs and the disintegration of states
through ethnic and other types of conflict.
- There is also a major fault line between the countries of
the North and those of the South, as the latter become progressively poorer. This
structural inequality has led increasingly to interference in national political and
economic policies in the South by international financial institutions.
- The following conclusions are drawn from this overview of
the external environment.
12.1 The absence of a
foreseeable conventional military threat provides considerable space to rationalise and
redesign the Defence Force. The goals and strategies of this process will be spelt out in
the Defence Review.
12.2 The SANDF has to maintain a core defence capability
because of the inherent unpredictability of the future. Such capability cannot be created
from scratch if the need suddenly arises. The maintenance and development of weapons
systems is necessaril y a long-term endeavour. The concept of a core defence capability is
discussed in Chapter
5.
[ Top ]
12.3 The Ministry and the SANDF will engage in co-operative
ventures with their counterparts throughout the world in such fields as training and
education, defence planning, exchange visits, joint exercises and procurement of arms and
equipment. Many suc h ventures are already underway.
12.4 Defence co-operation with other Southern African
states is a priority. South Africa will accordingly seek to strengthen the security and
defence forums of SADC and the Association of Southern African States. The question of
regional security is dis cussed further below.
12.5 Regional instability and underdevelopment can only be
addressed meaningfully through political reform, socio-economic development, and
inter-state co-operation in these spheres. Similarly, the prevention and management of
inter- and intra-state conf lict is primarily a political and not a military matter.
12.6 Situations may arise in Southern Africa where inter-
or intra-state conflict poses a threat to peace and stability in the region as a whole.
Peace operations which involve the deployment of the SANDF may be necessary in such
situations if political efforts to resolve the conflict are unsuccessful.
Chapter 5.
12.7 As a responsible member of the international
community, South Africa will conduct its foreign policy, arms trade and external defence
activities in accordance with international law and norms. South Africa has already joined
a number of multi-latera l arms control regimes.
REGIONAL SECURITY
- Following trends in other parts of the world, South Africa
will encourage the development of a `common security' approach in Southern Africa. In
essence, this will entail the SADC states shaping their political, security and defence
policies in co-op eration with each other.
- A common approach to security in Southern Africa is
necessary for a number of reasons. First, many of the domestic threats to individual
states are shared problems and impact negatively on the stability of neighbouring
countries.
- Second, it is possible that inter-state disputes could
emerge in relation to refugees, trade, foreign investment, natural resources and
previously suppressed territorial claims.
- Third, since the sub-continent is politically volatile and
its national and regional institutions are relatively weak, internal conflicts could give
rise to cross-border tensions and hostilities. This volatility and weakness also makes the
region vul nerable to foreign interference and intervention.
- Common security arrangements would have many advantages in
this context. They could facilitate the sharing of information and resources; the early
warning of potential crises; joint problem-solving; implementing Confidence- and
Security-Building Meas ures (CSBMs); negotiating security agreements and treaties; and
resolving inter-state conflict through peaceful means.
- Certain of these endeavours are the responsibility of the
Department of Foreign Affairs. Chief amongst them is the settlement of conflict through
preventive diplomacy, mediation or arbitration.
- Other types of activity, some of which are currently under
discussion in the newly formed Association of Southern African States, will be undertaken
by the DOD.
- First, regional defence co-operation could be promoted in
the fields of logistics; training and education programmes; intelligence; combined
exercises; mutual secondment of personnel; and the development of common doctrines and
operational procedures.
- Second, the government might be called upon by neighbouring
countries to play a number of supportive roles. For example, the SANDF could provide
assistance with respect to disaster relief; controlling cross-border trafficking in small
arms; clearing minefields; military training; and maintaining and upgrading weaponry and
equipment.
- Third, the DOD is keen to promote the implementation of
CSBMs. These are measures which provide for greater transparency in military matters in
order to alleviate possible mistrust and prevent misunderstandings from developing into
crises.
- Appropriate CSBMs might include the annual exchange of
information on defence budgets and troop deployment; notification and on-site observation
of specified military activities; verification procedures; a communications network; and
means of dealing with unusual or unscheduled military incidents.
- South Africa shares the view of many of its neighbours that
the creation of a standing peacekeeping force in the region is neither desirable nor
practically feasible. It is far more likely that the SADC countries will engage in ad-hoc
peace operation s if the need arises.
- South Africa will support the conclusion of multi-lateral
treaties on disarmament, conventional arms control, weapons of mass destruction and
foreign military involvement in the region. The most important agreement would be a
non-aggression pact whic h endorses the international prohibition on the threat or use of
force.
- Given South Africa's overwhelming military superiority on
the sub-continent, the adoption of a defensive and non-threatening posture would
contribute to building confidence and positive relationships.
- Further, reductions in force levels and weapons holdings
might stimulate a broader process of disarmament in Southern Africa. This would release
resources for development and thereby promote stability. However, force reductions should
be kept within reasonable proportions if South Africa is to play a leadership role in the
region.
- Finally, it is the view of government that South Africa has
a common destiny with Southern Africa. Domestic peace and stability will not be achieved
in a context of regional instability and poverty. It is therefore in South Africa's
long-term securi ty interests to pursue mutually beneficial relations with other SADC
states and to promote reconstruction and development throughout the region.
DOMESTIC CONTEXT
- From a security perspective there are three prominent trends
at domestic level. First, as noted in Chapter 2, there is an overwhelming need for
socio-economic development and reconstruction in order to address the root causes of much
personal insecur ity and social instability. This is a moral obligation and a strategic
imperative.
- Second, the country is characterised by endemic crime which
effects all sectors of society. The government is tackling this problem chiefly through
efforts to improve the criminal justice system, community policing and crime prevention
strategies. A long-term solution lies in upgrading the conditions of impoverished
communities through the RDP.
- Third, there has been a considerable reduction in the level
of public and political violence since the elections in April 1994. Nevertheless, violence
in many parts of the country remains unacceptably high and poses a serious threat to
public order a nd the security of citizens.
- Public order policing is primarily the responsibility of the
South African Police Service (SAPS). However, given the relative shortage of police
personnel, large numbers of troops are currently deployed to assist them. This tendency is
undesirable b ut it is likely to continue for the foreseeable future
Chapter 5
.
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Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of
South Africa
Chapter 5
ROLE AND FUNCTIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
- The
Interim Constitution
provides
that the SANDF may be employed in the following functions:
1.1 For service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
1.2 For service in compliance with the international
obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states.
1.3 For service in the preservation of life, health or
property.
1.4 For service in the provision or maintenance of
essential services.
1.5 For service in the upholding of law and order in the
Republic in co-operation with the South African Police Service under circumstances set out
in law where the said Police Service is unable to maintain law and order on its own.
1.6 For service in support of any department of state for
the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.
- It is the policy of government that the above functions do
not carry equal weight. The primary mission of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against
external military aggression. The other functions are secondary.
- The size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF will
therefore be determined mainly by its primary mission. However, provision will have to be
made for the special requirements of internal deployment and international peace
operations.
- The rest of this Chapter considers the various functions of
the Defence Force in more detail.
SELF-DEFENCE
- Governments have an inherent right and responsibility to
ensure the protection of the state and its people against external military threats. South
Africa will employ the following principal strategies to this end:
5.1 Political, Economic and Military Co-operation with other States.
In this context, a common security regime, regional defence co-operation and confidence-
and security-building measures in Southern Africa are particularly important
Chapter 4
5.2 Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflict
through Non-Violent Means. Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or
arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international
or regional body.
5.3 Deployment of the Defence Force. The use or threat of
force against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when
political solutions have been exhausted.
- It is clear from the above that the government's preferred
and primary course of action is to prevent conflict and war. South Africa will only turn
to military means when deterrence and non-violent strategies have failed.
- Deterrence requires the existence of a defence capability
which is sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors. Although South Africa is
not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be
turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore necessary to maintain a core defence
capability.
- A core defence capability includes a sustainable nucleus
with the following features:
[ Top ]
8.1 The ability to deal
with small-scale contingencies of a short-term nature.
8.2 The ability to deal with a range of contingencies.
8.3 The ability to expand the Defence Force to appropriate
levels within a realistic time frame should the threat situation deteriorate
significantly.
8.4 The maintenance and, where necessary, the upgrading or
replacement of equipment and weaponry.
8.5 An efficient intelligence capability to ensure early
warning of potential conflicts and crises.
- This "core force" approach takes account of
government spending priorities and the fact that the self-defence problem is likely to be
limited in the short- to medium-term. It does not require a large standing force. Instead,
the SANDF will comprise of a relatively small Full-Time Force and a sufficiently large
Part-Time Force Chapter
6 .
- The Defence Review will address in more detail the
implications of the core force approach for the size, doctrine, posture, structure,
weaponry and equipment of the SANDF.
- The Review will also address the strategic and technical
implications of the constitutional provision that the SANDF shall be "primarily
defensive in the exercise or performance of its powers and functions". As noted
earlier, the adoption of a defensive and non-threatening military posture will contribute
to promoting positive relationships and confidence in Southern Africa.
DEPLOYMENT IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE SAPS
- It was noted in Chapter 4 that SANDF troops are currently
employed on a widespread basis in support of the SAPS, and that such employment is likely
to persist for some time because of on-going public violence and the relative shortage of
police personnel.
- Nevertheless, the history of South Africa and many other
countries suggests that it is inappropriate to utilise armed forces in a policing role on
a permanent or semi-permanent basis. This perspective is based on the following
considerations:
13.1 Armed forces are not trained,
orientated or equipped for deployment against civilians. They are typically geared to
employ maximum force against an external military aggressor.
13.2 On-going employment in a policing function invariably
politicises a defence force.
13.3 Such employment may also undermine the image and
legitimacy of a defence force amongst sectors of the population.
13.4 Internal deployment places a substantial burden on the
defence budget.
13.5 It also has a disruptive effect on the economy where
large numbers of part-time soldiers are engaged.
13.6 Efforts to apply military solutions to political
problems are inherently limited and invariably lead to acts of repression.
- In the light of these considerations, the policy goal of the
government is to build the capacity of the police to deal with public violence on their
own while political solutions are being sought or have failed. The SANDF would only then
be deployed in the most exceptional circumstances, such as a complete breakdown of public
order. Accordingly, resources for maintaining internal stability should be channelled to
the SAPS rather than the SANDF.
- In the interim, the internal deployment of the military will
be subject to the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights and will be regulated by
legislation.
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INTERNATIONAL PEACE
OPERATIONS
- As a fully fledged member of the international community,
South Africa will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace
operations.
- In the short-term, however, such participation will be
regarded with a fair measure of caution since the political and military dynamics of these
operations are new to South Africa and the Defence Force. Further, the integration of
former armed forces is still underway and no training in peacekeeping has yet taken place.
- In order to prepare properly for peace operations, the DOD
is currently investigating the development of appropriate doctrines, operational
procedures and training programmes in co-operation with foreign partners.
- Public and parliamentary debate on the complexities and
different types of peace operations is equally important.
- South Africa will only become involved in specific peace
operations if the following conditions are met:
20.1
There should be parliamentary and public support for such involvement, and appreciation of
the associated costs and risks.
20.2 The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and
objectives.
20.3 There should be realistic criteria for terminating the
operation.
20.4 The operation should have been authorised by the
United Nations Security Council.
20.5 Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by
SADC and should be undertaken together with other SADC states rather than a unilateral
basis.
- South Africa's consideration of involvement in specific
peace operations will not be limited to the possible deployment of troops. The involvement
could also take the form of providing equipment, logistical support, engineering services,
communications systems and medical personnel and facilities.
OTHER DEFENCE FUNCTIONS
- As noted earlier, the Interim Constitution provides that the
SANDF may be employed in a range of activities in addition to those discussed above.
- By way of illustration, these activities may include
disaster relief; provision of emergency services; search and rescue; evacuation of South
African citizens from high threat areas; efforts to curtail cross-border crime; protection
of maritime and other natural resources; socio-economic upliftment; and regional defence
co-operation.
- However, it should be stressed again that these are
secondary functions. Extensive use of a defence force in non-military activities is
economically inefficient; it contributes to the militarisation of civil society; and it
undermines the preparedness and capabilities of the force with respect to its primary
mission. There are some exceptions to this general rule, such as disaster relief and
search and rescue activities.
- Finally, the SANDF can make an important contribution
towards developing the country's human resources through the special training programmes
associated with integration and demobilisation. For example, the Service Corps will train
its members in a range of vocational skills to prepare them for employment in civil
society Chapter 6
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Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of
South Africa
Chapter 6
HUMAN RESOURCE ISSUES
INTEGRATION
- The integration of former government, homeland and guerrilla
forces, many of which were once enemies, is a powerful illustration of the government's
commitment to national reconciliation and unity.
- Integration has two legs: incorporating into the SANDF all
personnel whose names appear on the Certified Personnel Register of the forces identified
in the Interim Constitution
(with
the subsequent inclusion of APLA); and training these members to meet international
standards of competence.
- Bridging training programmes have been designed to empower
members of the SANDF, irrespective of origin, so that they stand an equal chance of
demonstrating their suitability for a specific rank and mustering when rationalisation
occurs.
- The DOD has two governing principles for integration: all
members of the SANDF should be treated with respect and dignity; and integration should
proceed in the spirit of partnership which characterised negotiations in the pre-election
period.
- The overarching mission is to establish a new institution
which is professional and representative. Representivity refers both to the ethnic
composition of the Defence Force and to the fair incorporation of the former armed forces
at all ranks. The failure of this mission will critically undermine the legitimacy of the
SANDF.
- Thus far the process of integration has not been easy or
trouble-free. Numerous problems and grievances have emerged and, at times, have given rise
to serious tension. Many of these difficulties were inevitable given the political and
logistical complexities of merging forces. Nevertheless, the DOD is committed to
preventing and managing such problems and tension in a constructive way.
- A parliamentary Integration Oversight Committee has
accordingly been established to monitor the process; the Committee includes members of the
SANDF, the Defence Secretariat and the parliamentary defence committee. In addition, a
British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) is responsible for ensuring the
fairness of the process.
AN
ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE
- The system of white conscription was extremely divisive.
Many conscripts resorted to draft evasion, conscientious objection and emigration. The
`brain drain' and the disruptive effects of military camps provoked opposition from the
private sector, and the racial bias of the call-up exacerbated tension between the black
and white communities.
- Any continued enforcement of this system would be
discriminatory and contrary to the Interim Constitution. A moratorium has therefore been
placed on the prosecution of conscripts who do not respond positively to call-ups.
- As a result of integration, there is no need to conscript
additional personnel into the SANDF. Indeed, forces levels will have to be reduced
substantially through a process of demobilisation and rationalisation.
- For political, strategic and economic reasons, the SANDF
will be an all-volunteer force. It will comprise a relatively small Full-Time (or
Permanent Force), backed up by a sufficiently large Part-Time Force. The full-time
component has different categories of employment, including a flexible term service system
for uniformed members.
- There is also a Controlled Reserve which consists of trained
personnel who have served but have since departed from the SANDF. These people can be
called-up again if required.
- A basic structure of this nature is extremely flexible and
cost-effective. It will be capable of dealing with potential aggressors but is essentially
defensive in nature. It will also provide on-going interaction between "career
soldiers" and "citizen-soldiers".
- In order to attract a high quality of recruits and secure
the required rate of turnover, appropriate selection criteria, remuneration packages,
educational opportunities and training programmes will have to be developed for the
all-volunteer force.
PART-TIME
FORCE
- The Part-Time Force (PTF) will consist of personnel who
serve for short periods on an annual basis. They will be organised, trained and equipped
in such a way that they are available for rapid mobilisation alongside Permanent Force
members according to the demands placed on the SANDF.
- The new PTF will incorporate elements of the existing
Citizen Force and Rear Area Protection Units (formerly the Commandos), and will be
representative of the composition of the South African population. The size and structure
of the PTF will be derived from the force design and structure of the SANDF as a whole.
- The DOD is currently investigating the introduction of
financial and other incentives to encourage people to volunteer for part-time service. The
Ministry is also considering special measures to motivate employers to support members of
their staff who are part-time volunteers.
- The MOD will recommend to Parliament that statutory
recognition be given to a Part-Time Force National Council comprised of representatives of
the existing part-time forces and the former liberation armies. The primary goal of the
Council would be to promote the PTF as an integral part of the SANDF and to foster the
welfare of its part-time members.
[ Top ]
DEMOBILISATION
AND RATIONALISATION
- As a result of integration, force levels have been greatly
inflated. The current size of the SANDF is neither cost-effective nor strategically
appropriate.
- A process of demobilisation and rationalisation is therefore
being planned, and in certain respects is already underway. Over the next few years, after
the completion of integration, upwards of 30 000 soldiers and officers may be rationalised
or demobilised.
- Demobilisation refers to the voluntary release of members of
the former non-statutory forces who are constitutionally part of the SANDF but who either
do not wish to serve in the Defence Force or are unable to do so for reasons of age,
ill-health or aptitude.
- Since these people contributed to the struggle against
apartheid, it would be unjust to end their military careers without compensation,
especially in the case of aged and disabled veterans. They will consequently be assisted
financially, as well as through the Special Pensions Act envisaged by the Interim
Constitution. It is a matter of great importance that this Act is now promulgated.
- Further, the Cabinet has approved the establishment of a
Service Corps to upgrade the education and vocational skills of ex-combatants, and to
assist in their reintegration into civilian society.
- The Service Corps has been conceived as a project of the
RDP. It will operate on a national and regional level in conjunction with the RDP and
other government departments to administer the demobilisation of an estimated 10 000
- Rationalisation will entail the reduction of the Full-Time
Force following integration. This process will be based on budgetary considerations and
the future size and shape of the SANDF.
- Rationalisation will take place according to the following
principles: fair labour practice; all members being equally eligible; the enhancement of
representivity and productivity; the maintenance of expertise; and the retention of people
with a high level of performance or potential.
- The DOD is committed to ensure that the process does not
discriminate against members of any of the former forces which now make up the SANDF. A
formula for achieving proportional representation will therefore have to be determined.
- Demobilisation and rationalisation will be handled with
great sensitivity. This is both a moral obligation and a political necessity. The
experience of neighbouring states suggests that if former soldiers are not assisted in
adapting to civilian life they may be a burden on society and may engage in crime and
banditry.
- The DOD will therefore develop a 3-4 year programme to
prepare former soldiers for meaningful civilian careers. In liaison with educational
institutions and employer bodies, every effort will be made to identify educational and
employment opportunities in civil society.
- This programme is essentially a socio-economic project. For
budgetary purposes, it should be regarded as part of the RDP rather than the normal
defence function.
- The DOD will present to Parliament detailed plans for
demobilisation and rationalisation once these have been finalised.
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
- The integration of forces has substantially altered the
composition of the Defence Force. For historical reasons, however, the SANDF does not yet
reflect the demographic composition of South Africa.
- In order to secure the legitimacy of the armed forces, the
MOD is committed to the long-term goal of overcoming the legacy of apartheid and ensuring
that the SANDF, and its leadership in particular, is representative of the South African
population.
- The Ministry will therefore oversee the design and
implementation of an affirmative action and equal opportunity programme.
- The emphasis of the programme will be on the training and
development of black officers. Appropriate strategies in this regard will include special
training courses, career development plans, and the reorientation of recruitment and
promotion systems. These strategies are intended to avoid compromising professional
standards and damaging the morale of black and white personnel.
- The programme will also seek to identify and eliminate
discriminatory practises and attitudes in the Defence Force. This is both a constitutional
imperative and a matter of `combat readiness'. The SANDF will not perform its functions
effectively if capable people are excluded from senior posts because of racism or sexism,
or if these tendencies undermine cohesion and morale.
- Similarly, it will be necessary to review what is meant by
`professional standards'. Certain standards may be unalterable, such as those related to
the utilisation of weaponry and equipment, but others may be culturally loaded.
- The DOD will present to Parliament more detailed objectives
and strategies for equal opportunity and affirmative action in the SANDF. The Minister
will also report annually to Parliament on the progress made in implementing the
programme.
DEFENCE LABOUR
RELATIONS
- The DOD is considering various approaches to the question of
the appropriate labour relation machinery by means of which the interests of members of
the SANDF can be articulated. A comparison with other countries indicates that
unionisation, even with severe limitations, is the exception in regard to the armed forces
in democratic countries.
- The DOD will have to weigh carefully whether this is not an
area where reasonable limitations upon conventional labour rights should not be imposed.
The following factors need to be noted: the difficult process of integration under way;
the ready access to arms and weapons; the importance of the SANDF as a guarantor of
stability during the transition; and the potential for the promotion of racial and other
divisions in the SANDF.
- Such limitations have been recognised in the
International Labour Organisation
conventions
which accept that the armed forces constitute an exception to the usual scope of
application of such rights. It is equally clear, however, that members of the SANDF should
be entitled to effective and just grievance procedures, channels of communication and
other mechanisms for ensuring that their aspirations and complaints are heard and
addressed.
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Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of
South Africa
Chapter 7
BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS
- Defence budgets are typically the product of a range of
considerations: the wealth and size of a country; competing demands on resources from
different sectors of government and the population; prevailing and projected threat
scenarios; the actual and anticipated role of the Defence Force; and its doctrine and
posture.
- As indicated previously, in the South African context there
is pressure to reduce defence spending substantially:
21. There is an urgent requirement to divert resources to the
RDP in order to meet basic
socio-economic needs. A failure to meet these needs will generate conflict and
instability.
2.2 There is no conventional military threat in the
foreseeable future.
2.3 South Africa has no aggressive intentions towards any
state.
2.4 South Africa enjoys co-operative relations with its
neighbouring states. The non-military threats emanating from instability and
underdevelopment in Southern Africa should be tackled primarily by political and
socio-economic measures.
2.5 The ending of the Cold War has given rise to
disarmament in many parts of the world, including Southern Africa.
- At the same time, there are several reasons to avoid making
radical cuts to the defence budget:
3.1 The SANDF
has to maintain a long-term capability to fulfil its primary mission. It is not feasible
to create such capability from a low level of preparedness if the need suddenly arises. It
is therefore imperative to prepare for the upgrading or rep lacement of obsolete equipment
and to retain a sustainable core force
Chapter 5
.
3.2 The
Interim Constitution provides
that the SANDF shall be a balanced, modern and technologically advanced military force.
3.3 The widespread internal deployment of the SANDF in
co-operation with the police necessitates retention of the ability to mobilise substantial
numbers of troops.
3.4 South Africa is expected to play a prominent role in
new spheres of activity in Africa and Southern Africa, chiefly peace operations and
regional defence co-operation.
3.5 The integration of forces has raised force levels
substantially; a process of rationalisation and demobilisation will consequently be
undertaken. The success of integration, demobilisation and rationalisation requires
adequate funding.
3.6 The defence budget has been cut by almost 50% over the
past five years. This had a significant impact on the military's anti-aircraft, armour,
air and maritime capabilities in particular.
- It is evident from the above that there are competing
pressures on the defence budget. This true of most countries, particularly in
post-conflict situations.
- In democratic societies the debate around defence spending
is informed by public opinion and the professional views of the defence establishment and
other government departments. The resolution of the debate is the prerogative of
Parliament on an ann ual and longer-term basis.
- The Defence Review will entail comprehensive long-range
planning in the light of approved defence policy and the new political and strategic
environment. Well-motivated budgetary forecasts and proposals will emerge from this
exercise.
- The Defence Review will also include an examination of
prevailing conditions in the SANDF with the view to rationalising current spending,
eliminating waste and unnecessary duplication, and determining the most efficient means of
managing human and ma terial resources.
- Prior to the completion of the Defence Review, the DOD will
provide Parliament with the information and analysis which is required to make sound
decisions on the defence budget.
- Finally, the establishment of a relatively small Full-Time
Force and a sufficiently large Part-Time Force will be one of the principal means of
ensuring a cost-effective defence capability
Chapter 6
. It is
important to re iterate that demobilisation and rationali-sation will generate additional
costs in the medium-term but yield considerable savings in the long-term.
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Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of
South Africa
Chapter 8
ARMS CONTROL AND THE ARMAMENTS INDUSTRY
- The future of South Africa's armaments industry, and the
related questions of arms trade policy and decision-making procedures, are currently under
review by a Cabinet committee. The committee is charged with formulating comprehensive new
policy on the industry and the marketing of defence equipment.
- The Executive will ensure that South Africa's arms trade is
properly controlled and conducted in a manner which is responsible and based on respect
for human rights.
- In circumstances of diminishing domestic defence
expenditure, the industry will be encouraged to convert production capability to
non-military products without losing key technological capacity.
- The government is committed to supporting the international
cause of arms control and disarmament. It has signed many treaties and participates in
several multi-lateral initiatives relating to weapons of mass destruction, conventional
weapons and controversial munitions such as landmines.
Draft White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of
South Africa
Comments and Suggestions Sheet
SEND YOUR COMMENTS OR SUGGESTIONS TO:
Ministry of Defence
Private Bag X 427
Pretoria
0001
Pretoria : Telephone [012] 428-2178 -- Facsimile: [012] 45-2901
Cape Town: Telephone [021] 469-6017 -- Facsimile: [021] 45-5870
[ Top ]
Last modified: 23 April 2008 12:54:02. |
