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8 November 2006

1. Introduction

Africa is determined to play its role in finding African solutions to the continent's challenges whilst working with international partners.

The African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have put enormous efforts into the facilitation of negotiations for peaceful resolution of existing conflicts and the effective implementation of peace agreements. As a result there has been a steady decline in the number of active conflicts on the African continent and an increasing demand for the consolidation of peace, reconstruction and development.

Notwithstanding a long and sometimes tortuous path, Sudanese decision makers at the end of 2006 face important strategic decisions that will determine the future shape and nature of the country after 2011 and the manner in which the intervening years will unfold. In fact the fate of Africa's largest country, one that bridges the north with the south, the east to the west, is a powerful determinant of the continents future as important as that of securing progress in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

2. Taking stock

The political scaffolding has been put in place Africa's longest civil war formally ended on 9 January 2005 at Naivasha in Kenya with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the Government of National Unity (GNU) was established by mid 2005, the Sudanese and Southern Sudan Constitutions were adopted, conflict in the South Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile regions ended. All of this was achieved with the assistance of Africa and the international community. It is imperative now that with the political superstructure in place both domestic and international role players shift their focus into post conflict construction.

For these reasons, the AU is focusing more attention on measures that consolidate peace and pave the way for growth and regeneration. These AU efforts are informed by past practice of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) in reconstruction efforts and all relevant OAU/AU mandates and decision including, Article 5(2) of the Constitutive Act, on the basis of which the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established and the OAU/AU decision to establish a ministerial committee for the reconstruction of the Sudan. But first let us place the AU's position in a broad based context.

3. Post conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD)

This AU policy on PCRD derives from the reality of Africa making greater progress in resolving conflicts on the continent. The 9th ordinary session of the Executive Council (ExCo) in Banjul, Gambia from 28 to 29 June 2006 adopted the PCRD document.

The objective of the PCRD is "to improve timeliness, effectiveness and co-ordination of activities in post conflict countries and to lay the foundation for social justice and sustainable peace in line with Africa's vision of renewal and growth".

The PCRD is, therefore, conceived as a tool to:

a) consolidate peace and prevent relapse of violence
b) help address the root causes of conflict
c) encourage and fast-track planning and implementation of reconstruction activities
d) enhance complementarities and coordination between and among diverse actors engaged in PCRD processes.

The PCRD principles are African leadership, national and local ownership, inclusiveness, equity and non-discrimination, co-operation and cohesion and capacity building for sustainability. The promotion of human security is at the basis of all PCRD activities. This policy must be pursued within the global context of the search for peace and security and hence complement existing international initiatives.

The PCRD draws on lessons learned from past African reconstruction efforts, which indicate weaknesses from the conceptual to the strategic and operational levels. Most reconstruction models have been borrowed from outside Africa and have lacked comprehensiveness, favouring some aspects of PCRD to the exclusion of others, sometimes risking the resumption of conflict. Taking this into account there is critical need for PCRD processes to translate the commitment to peace into tangible benefits. This is dependent on the formulation of comprehensive integrated strategies and approaches that require substantial institutional and human capacities in the implementation of PCRD.

This PCRD will reduce pressure on affected countries by providing a consistent and coherent strategy that will fast track the planning and implementation of quick impact programmes, consolidate peace in the emergency/transition phase and hence increase the chances of successful long term sustainable development.

This policy must provide parameters to improve coherence and co-ordination of all action between State and non-State actors operating at local, national, regional and/or international levels during all phases of PCRD.

Against this background, I would like to dwell on some of the challenges facing Sudan and the south in particular and venture some thoughts on what needs to be done urgently to bring about sustainable development, viable and functioning government and security structures and address the vexing challenges of human security affecting the southern Sudan.

Of course we must not be deflected from the CPA/Southern Sudan efforts, the success of which must serve to interlock with resolving all of Sudan's regional challenges including that of Darfur.

4. Challenges facing southern Sudan

If we are to do Sudan as a whole a service we need to take an unvarnished, critical look at the situation in the south after which I will briefly return to the wider national context. I would propose doing so by looking at a range of issues.

(i) Governance in the south

The success of the CPA will depend to a large degree on two difficult transitions, the one for the government of Sudan to become an effective Government of National Unity (GNU), the other for the government of southern Sudan to participate meaningfully in the GNU and develop institutions to effectively govern the south. We in South Africa have some experience of this with respect to our own transition and experience of a GNU in the first two years of democracy. At present the government of southern Sudan lacks the core institutions, infrastructure and capacity that it must have if it is to effectively govern and respond to the needs of its citizens. To assist the south, a trilateral partnership has been created between South Africa's Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the University of South Africa (UNISA). DFA provides political and financial support to the programme and UNISA serves as an implementing agent and is responsible for the conceptualisation and development of training material. Thus far, key South African departments involved include the departments of finance, public service and administration, communications, justice, correctional services and the South African Police Service (SAPS). Four hundred and twenty three delegates have participated in the programme.

There is still a pressing need for attention to be given to creating and capacitating financial and judicial institutions and economic and social infrastructure to provide essential services. There is a need to equip the government of the south to manage significant revenues including establishing donor co-ordination mechanisms. Equally important is the ability of the government of the south to communicate government processes, decisions and priorities to the people of southern Sudan. The CPA specifies that a census must be completed by July 2007 with elections to be held no later that July 2009. Capacity must be created to conduct a reliable census which will be an important instrument in providing citizenship, correctly targeting government programmes, protecting the rights of displaced persons and ensuring democratic representation of the people through elections.

(ii) Wealth sharing

Revenue sharing as provided for by the CPA and Wealth-Sharing Agreement of 7 January 2004 is capable of contributing to the establishment of new institutions, construction in the South, infrastructure development and essential services. The peculiarity of Sudan's newly acquired oil wealth is that it is set to become one of Africa's wealthiest states but has some of the continent's most negative development indicators. The international community should assist the government of southern Sudan to increase its capacity to absorb, distribute and utilise these revenues. Care will have to be taken that oil revenues are not susceptible to corruption and do not lead to the entrenchment of unaccountable elites as has happened elsewhere which is no easy task. The government of the south needs independent means of verifying whether it is in fact receiving 50 percent of the net revenue from southern oilfields to which it is entitled if confidence and trust are to develop. The international community could assist here in tracking the flow of oil revenues and assisting the government of the south to gain insight into existing oil contracts. Whereas increased oil revenue ought to ease budgetary constraints, it will not remove the political sensitivities attached to the distribution of the revenue. It will be important to ensure that the status of the oil rich three areas, namely the provinces of Abyei, Blue Nile State and the Nuba Mountains are resolved amicably.

(iii) Post conflict construction

I use the word construction consciously here. The under-development of southern Sudan is the result, among others, of decades of marginalisation and protracted conflict between Sudan's centre and wider national periphery. Efforts to respond to the situation in southern Sudan take place within the parameters of the CPA and are supported by the World Bank – United Nations (UN) Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), which has compiled an assessment of what needs to be done. The AU set up a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Committee (PCRC) chaired by South Africa to effect construction efforts. Despite the best intentions of those involved, the expectations at grassroots level have so far been disappointed. Construction efforts on the ground have been inadequate to date because of a lack of functioning governance systems to mobilise resources and capacity. This results in a mismatch between the efforts of government institutions and development agencies and the expectations of the people. Going a step further, the ineffectiveness of construction efforts tarnishes the image and legitimacy of both the central government and international efforts and easily creates a sense of abandonment and isolation in the minds of the people of the south.

(iv) Human security

There is much that the international community can do here. There is a desperate need for basic services such as potable water, primary healthcare, education, and food aid. The World Food Programme estimates that 26 percent of the Sudanese population is malnourished with food security expected to remain critical due to increased demand from displaced people returning to their homes, the lack of structures to properly market agricultural produce, unstable commodity prices and weak public and social services in the south. The international community should, for example, assist with the creation and adoption of legal and institutional frameworks to resolve the conflicts and tensions that will inevitably arise when returnees claim land and water rights that now have new owners. The international community should also be investing in essential services and local infrastructure to stabilise the vast war affected rural areas of the south where refugees and returnees are expected. We should also be preparing for people to migrate to urban centres in search of employment and access to public and social services as properly managed urban development could create significant opportunities for economic recovery. There is also place for international efforts to support dialogue between citizens, civil society and government, to promote the role of women and marginalised groups and communicate messages of tolerance, anti-corruption and peace building through civic education.

(v) Security

It is important to note the security development nexus here and make the point that not only does security enable development but that development also creates security. If continued insecurity in southern Sudan is not to undermine the gains of the peace process and affect previously stable regions much work still needs to be done in integrating former rival armies into joint units to serve in what were garrison towns and in disarming, demobilising and reintegrating formal and informal militias. Political tension will increase if the reintegration process is incorrectly handled and the issue of command and control of the security forces is not properly managed between the north and south. There is also a pressing need for securing funding for security sector reform and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process. It is also unrealistic to expect police in the south to provide protection and security to citizens if their capacity problems are not addressed. There is the need to ensure the military is subject to civilian control.

5. The national context

In brief may I highlight the following three national requirements for Sudan's success not only with respect to the south:
(i) the necessity for power and wealth sharing throughout Sudan
(ii) the importance of inclusive resolution of conflict and ending marginalisation throughout this great country
(iii) the need to resolve the problems affecting Sudan and finding a sustainable solution by ensuring unity, stability and equitable development throughout the country.

In this respect may I state the following, despite the present international focus on Darfur, it is necessary to remain committed to the implementation of the CPA. Events elsewhere in Sudan should not divert the international community's attention away from assisting the two sides with the CPA implementation.

With regard to the apparent impasse over the disputed oil producing region of Abye, we must encourage both the SPLM and NCP to resolve their differences and implement the CPA. Once solved, the north-south border should be speedily finalised.

The dispute over the secretariat of the National Petroleum Commission (NPC) likewise needs to be resolved, including revenue sharing in a transparent manner.

The recent violent incidents near Juba are of concern. It is symptomatic of the wider problem of militias, some remain unaligned whereas others have not yet been amalgamated into the SAF/SPLM. However, the formation of Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) and the withdrawal of SAF/SPLM forces have on the whole proceeded smoothly and needs to be completed.

6. Conclusion

In closing I would like to emphasise the importance of ensuring that the peace dividend expected by the Sudanese people after years of conflict actually emerges. Winning popular support is critical to the success of the CPA and the future of Sudan. We do not have the luxury of time if we are to make unity attractive to the people of southern Sudan. To date shortcomings in implementing the CPA have been outweighed by the benefits of peace between the north and south but there is a risk that over time, delays and disputes may undermine the legitimacy of the agreement in the eyes of the people of the south. The international community must assist in delivering tangible results to people on the ground, or see the return of disillusionment and alienation. In so doing we also need to be thinking about how we narrow the diverging international positions and perceptions of the AU, UN, European Union (EU), United States (US), China and Middle East players involved in Sudan. Finally we need to also ensure that the implementation of the CPA takes place within the PCRD framework and is not overshadowed and undermined by events in Darfur. It goes without saying that effort there to bring all the protagonists on board in a win-win solution is essential.

In closing, President Thabo Mbeki made the claim in his State of the Nation address to the South African Parliament in February this year that our country had entered an 'age of hope'. It is our desire as South Africans to ensure that other African States are also able to experience their own ages of hope on a continent where conflict becomes but a memory. South Africa is willing to contribute in co-operation with the international community to finding African solutions for African problems and creating a brighter future for Sudan and all Sudanese.

I thank you!

Issued by: Ministry for Intelligence Services
8 November 2006
Source: Ministry for Intelligence Services (http://www.intelligence.gov.za)