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17 May 2006

South African foreign policy is no longer merely about consolidating political relations with countries of the world. South Africa’s foreign policy is increasingly about translating strong political relations into strong economic relations that will contribute to our vision of creating a better South Africa for all those who live within it.

In this regard, international visits by the President, Deputy President, Minister and Deputy Ministers are not undertaken simply for the purpose of visiting the countries concerned. They are undertaken to further consolidate political relations and to increase the impetus for economic co-operation.

* President Mbeki’s visit to United Kingdom and South African-United Kingdom Bilateral Commission

South African President Thabo Mbeki will hold political and economic discussions with his British counterpart, Prime Minister Tony Blair in London scheduled for Wednesday, 24 May 2006.

President Thabo Mbeki’s visit to London comes within the context of South Africa’s commitment to consolidate North-South relations in the interest of achieving the developmental agenda of the South in general and Africa in particular.

South Africa, together with China, India, Brazil and Mexico, is considered a "Strategic Outreach Partner" of the Group of Eight (G8) and has again been invited to participate in the 2006 G8 meeting being hosted by Russia scheduled from 15 to 17 July 2006.

The 2006 G8 meeting will discuss:
* international energy security (including climate change);
* healthcare: prevention of communicable diseases;
* education development.

During discussions with Prime Minister Blair on Wednesday, 24 May 2006, President Thabo Mbeki will seek to:
* further consolidate and strengthen bilateral relations between both countries
* actively promote the African agenda of development, conflict resolution and peace and security including the situation in the Great Lakes region, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire
* further enhance multilateral co-operation between South Africa and the United Kingdom especially in the
* World Trade Organisation (WTO) Doha Development Round negotiations
* restructuring of the United Nations
* Middle East Peace Process
* promotion of a diplomatic solution to the situation in Iran.
While in London President Mbeki is also expected to interact with British captains of industry.

United Kingdom – South Africa Bilateral Forum

South African Foreign Minister Dr Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma will lead the South African delegation to the seventh session of the UK-SA Bilateral Forum scheduled in London for Tuesday to Wednesday, 23 to 24 May 2006.

The Forum is entitled, "The UK and South Africa: Building together on the 2005 Year of Africa," and will be co-chaired by newly appointed Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett.

The following South African government departments will be represented at the Forum:
* Foreign Affairs
* Arts and Culture
* Defence
* Education
* Environmental Affairs and Tourism
* Home Affairs
* Science and Technology
* Trade and Industry
* Sport and Recreation SA.

A roundtable discussion on Africa, entitled "Africa 2005: Putting Our Promises into Practice," will focus on achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and ensuring implementation of the commitments made in the report of the Commission for Africa and at Gleneagles in 2005. Discussions will also include the operationalisation of the African Union, the implementation of NEPAD and the promotion of peace and stability in Africa.

Since the briefing of February 2006, there have been many developments domestically, continentally and internationally. The most pressing issue facing the international community remains the comprehensive reform of the United Nations.

Restructuring Global Political and Economic Governance

At the Secretary-General’s assertion "we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights," there is a need to develop a vision of collective security based o n a shared assessment of the current global threats and obligations needed in addressing these threats.

In pursuit thereof we must deepen the dialogue directed towards the restructuring of the existing global power relations, particularly through the reform of the global multilateral institutions such as the United Nations, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the WTO.

World Trade Organisation (WTO)

The Hong Kong Ministerial last December provided a workable platform to keep the Doha Development Agenda afloat. The most important outcomes were:

* Doha Round to be concluded by end 2006
* agricultural export subsidies to be eliminated by 2013
* new schedule of commitments by July 2006
* duty and quota free access to 97% of products from LDCs from 2008
* aid for Trade package details to be finalised in 2006
* full modalities in agriculture and non-agricultural market access (NAMA) by April 2006.

Clearly there has not been sufficient progress.

Sadly the planned ministerial meeting scheduled for 30 April 2006 was postponed, following the failure of the process to produce modalities as agreed upon in Hong Kong. Mr Pascal Lamy made it clear that there would not be any new deadlines for NAMA modalities, but rather, work should be intensified with a view to complete the text before July.

What is needed is the appropriate political will to break the existing logjam!

It should not be a case of "power is might." This leaves no space for the underdeveloped and developing countries to be taken seriously. There needs to be compromise from all sides, especially with regard to the Security Council, HRC, WTO, else these multilateral institutions will lose the very essence of their being.

In his speech to the World Summit last September, President Mbeki referred to "the widely disparate conditions of existence and interests as well as the gross imbalance of power," which define the relationship among Member States of the United Nations (UN). This is the main reason why we have not yet achieved the security consensus needed, if we are to maintain peace in the world on a basis of agreement and collective action rather than the unilateral application of power.

This imbalance needs to be redressed. But the imbalance itself means that those seeking to redress it do not have the leverage to impose their will on the rest of the world through the current multilateral systems.

United Nations Reform
South Africa's position

As chairperson of the Group of 77 and China in 2006, South Africa will not only continue to be engaged in the implementation of the 2005 Summit Outcome, but will also be the lead negotiator on behalf of the Group on many of the reform elements.

United Nations Security Council Reform
The comprehensive reform of the United Nations Security Council remains work in progress characterised by three main initiatives. These are the African Union resolution, the new Group of three (Brazil, Germany, and India) resolution and the S5 (Switzerland, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein and Singapore) draft resolution on UN Security Council Working Methods.

The African Union Assembly of 2004 in Addis Ababa reaffirmed the Common African Position as embodied in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration and Resolution and stressed the importance of African unity.

The African resolution on UNSC reform was formally introduced in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 14 December 2005 (A/60/L.41). The 6th Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government (Khartoum, Sudan, 22 to 24 January 2006), decided to maintain the resolution before the UN General Assembly and all Member States were requested to co-sponsor it.

The AU took this step to objectively test the support among UN Member States for Africa’s position, including the allocation of five non-permanent seats and 2 permanent seats with the veto to Africa. A General Assembly vote would also reveal the overall prospects of any reform of the Security Council and influence the course of the debate on the way forward.

The AU Heads of State and Government further decided to renew the mandate of the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government as well as that the Ministerial Follow-up Mechanism should continue consultations with a view to promote and support the Common African Position on UN reform including the reform of the Security Council. The Assembly requested the Committee of Ten to submit a progress report on this issue to the next Ordinary Session of the Assembly in July 2006.

It is not expected that there will be a major movement on this matter, as the positions of the different countries have remained unchanged. Africa is still advancing its Common Position despite the fact that many consider the position on the veto to be a non-starter. It is also important to note that the Group of four (G4) resolutions were reintroduced by a "G3" without Japan. The latter is of the view that in the current context the G4 resolution would not pass.

South Africa will continue to argue that the reform and enlargement of the Security Council is a priority and should be seen as an integral part of the UN reform. We should resist attempts to postpone or delay this important matter.

G3 resolution on the reform of the UN Security Council

Brazil, India and Germany (G3) have proposed an enlargement of the Security Council to 25 Members (six permanent members and four new non-permanent members). In the new G3 proposal the names of candidate countries (G4) for the permanent category would be identified and provisions made for the granting to Africa of 2 seats without naming the African countries. This would then allow Africa to name its candidates at a later stage. The resolution also provides for the two African seats to be occupied on a rotational basis whilst Africa is still in a process of deciding on its permanent candidates.

The G3 proposal provides only for one additional non-permanent seat for Africa instead of two. It would not accommodate the African Common Position on the veto. The G4 position only calls for a review clause on the issue of the veto fifteen years after the reform comes into affect whereas the African Common Position calls for granting of the veto to all new permanent members of the Security Council.

Human Rights Commission

The first election of the members of the newly established Human Rights Council (HRC) was held by the General Assembly on 9 May 2006. Term of office will begin on 19 June 2006.

Candidates were elected directly and individually by a majority of the Members of the General Assembly and shall not be eligible for immediate re-election after two consecutive terms (para.7 of resolution A/RES/60/251).
South Africa was elected to the Human Rights Council by 179 votes from 191 countries.

Election results

African states

Algeria (one year)
Cameroon (three years)
Djibouti (three years)
Gabon (two years)
Ghana (two years)
Mali (two years)
Mauritius (three years)
Morocco (one year)
Nigeria (three years)
Senegal (three years)
South Africa (one year)
Tunisia (one year)
Zambia (two years)

Asian States
Bahrain (one year)
Bangladesh (three years)
China (three years)
India (one year)
Indonesia (one year)
Japan (two years)
Jordan (three years)
Malaysia (three years)
Pakistan (two years)
Philippines (one year)
Republic of Korea (two years)
Saudi Arabia (three years)
Sri Lanka (two years)

Eastern European States
Azerbaijan (three years)
Czech Republic (one year)
Poland (one year)
Romania (two years)
Russian Federation (three years)
Ukraine (two years)

Latin American and Caribbean States
Argentina (one year)
Brazil (two years)
Cuba (three years)
Ecuador (one year)
Guatemala (two years)
Mexico (three years)
Peru (two years)
Uruguay (three years)

Western European and other States
Canada (three years)
Finland (one year)
France (two years)
Germany (three years)
Netherlands (one year)
Switzerland (three years)
United Kingdom (two years)

Peace-building Commission:

The Peace-building Commission was established on 20 December 2005 by simultaneously adopting resolutions in this regard.

The broad objective of the Commission is to ensure a smoother transition from conflict to development in States emerging from conflict, thereby facilitating post-conflict peace-building, reconstruction and development in order to achieve sustainable peace (i.e. preventing States from relapsing into conflict).

The Commission will mainly be a co-ordinating mechanism of all the actors that are involved in assisting countries emerging from conflict. This usually includes UN agencies, regional organisations and bilateral donors. The value added of the Peace-building Commission would be to bring coherence to the work of these various entities around a commonly agreed programme. Its second main focus would be to ensure that the international community has a longer-term horizon in assisting a country emerging from conflict. Hitherto a weakness of the approach of the international community has been its short-term focus, often reducing support to a country once elections have been held. This has led to a relapse in most cases back into conflict with costly consequences for the countries concerned as well as the international community. Therefore the Commission holds a potential to make a significant contribution to post-conflict peace-building. It is also important to note that most of the countries that will be on the agenda of the Peace-building Commission will be African countries.

The Commission has to be operationalised. This involves the creation of an Organisational Committee that will also set the rules of procedure and working methods for the PBC as well as determine its agenda, inter alia, its focus, its mandate, reporting to and interaction with, the United Nationa General Assembly (UNGA), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

Permanent members accorded themselves permanent membership of the Organisational Committee. In addition the formula agreed for the membership of the Organisational Committee will also provide a number of developed/donor States with long-term membership of the Commission. Some countries are concerned that a strong donor driven agenda will be advanced during the operationalisation of the Commission, and that the interests of the donor community could guide the focus and rules of procedure of the PBC as well as the interpretation of its mandate.

Terrorism

There has been no agreement on the definition of terrorism.

Secretary-General’s initiative re: counter-terrorism was released on 2 May 2006 and is entitled, "Uniting against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy".

Uniting against terrorism: Recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy

Strategy launched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in New York, 2 May 2006

The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit asked the Secretary-General to "submit proposals to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system to assist States in combating terrorism and enhance co-ordination of United Nations activities in this regard".

The Secretary-General's vision on that matter is contained in the document uniting against terrorism: Recommendations for a global counter-terrorism strategy.

The recommendations stem from a fundamental conviction that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes, is unacceptable and can never be justified.

In formulating recommendations in the strategy, the Secretary-General built further on the "five Ds" the fundamental components that he first outlined in Madrid in 2005, which he believes are interlinked. They are:
* dissuading people from resorting to terrorism or supporting it;
* denying terrorists the means to carry out an attack;
* deterring States from supporting terrorism;
* developing State capacity to defeat terrorism, and;
* defending human rights.

The Secretary-General's strategy elaborates on steps to build state capacity, and to strengthen the work of the United Nations in this field.

The strategy also highlights defending human rights, which the Secretary-General regards as a prerequisite to every aspect of any effective counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy mentions "the human rights of all of the victims of terrorism, of those suspected of terrorism, of those affected by the consequences of terrorism". States must also ensure that any measures taken to combat terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.

Member States began discussing the strategy in the General Assembly on 11 May 2006.

Management reforms (in the Secretariat):

The UNGA adopted a first cluster of management reforms related to the UN Secretariat in December 2005. These included the establishment of an Ethics Office (to assist the UN Secretary-General in ensuring the ethical conduct of staff), increasing the auditing and investigating capacity of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and establishing an Independent Audit Advisory Committee (to oversee the UN's internal audit processes).

The Secretary-General initially submitted a second cluster of management reform proposals (A/60/296) on 7 March 2006 to the informal working group (of the UNGA Plenary) on Secretariat and Management Reform.

The President of the General Assembly (GA), after extensive consultations with the representatives of the major groups informed the Plenary that the report of the Secretary-General would be introduced and considered by the Fifth Committee (Administrative & Budgetary) of the GA. The oral announcement by the President of the General Assembly conformed to the position of the G77 and China adopted in February and March 2006 that a substantive discussion is necessary of the proposals put forward by the UN Secretary-General.

The agreement reached by the President of the GA included three elements:
* that the Fifth Committee will consider all elements of the report
* the Fifth Committee would adopt a resolution on the report, which will be transmitted to the Plenary
* it was the expectation of the President that the Committee would conclude its consideration by 18 April 2006.

However, before the introduction of the report on 3 April 2006, it became clear that the Fifth Committee would only have a limited number of sessions available to consider the report.

The G-77 has given notice that it will not be bound by 18 April 2006 deadline.
The Secretary-General's report included amongst others the following management reform proposals:

* delegating the UNSG's formal authority and accountability for the management and the overall direction of the operational functions of the Secretariat to the Deputy Secretary-General
* restricting Member States' engagement with the Secretariat on financial and budgetary issues to limited and widely proliferated working groups
* scaling down the Secretariat's reporting functions to Member States
* reorganising and limiting Member States' substantive engagement of UN budgetary issues, including expanding the UNSG's authority to redeploy posts
* eliminating Member States' oversight of UN programme co-ordination
* significant and extensive changes to UN Human Resources Management practices as well as the UN staff component.

Many of these proposals have caused a great deal of concern among developing countries. Developing countries are concerned that the international character of the Secretariat is being undermined, in particular at senior management levels, the priorities of the Organisation is changing at the expense of its development priorities, and the decision-making power of developing countries are being eroded. There is also resistance, particularly from within the Group of 77, to these proposals which are regarded as an effort by the United States, and other major contributors to the UN Budget, to give themselves firmer control over the Secretariat, the allocation of funds, the appointment of personnel and the prioritisation of UN programmes.

The G77 identified three areas in the report that were of great concern to the Group. The areas are in line with positions that the G77 adopted during the World Summit and budget negotiations in 2005. The areas include:
1. Proposals five and six, which deal with the new functions for the Deputy Secretary General in relation to that of the Secretary-General, as well as rearranging the Departments of the Secretariat. These proposals provide for the Deputy Secretary-General of the UN to be given more powers and actually make him/her the Chief Operating Officer of the Organisation. The Secretary-General would in fact be the figurehead. The problem with this is that it is the Secretary-General who is elected by and therefore accountable to Member States and not the Deputy Secretary-General. It would also contradict the UN Charter, which provides for the Secretary-General to be the chief accounting officer for the Organisation.

2. Proposal 16, which provides for extensive flexibility to the Secretariat regarding the allocation of human and financial resources without setting out the parameters for accountability to Member States.
The Group of 77 has a longstanding position that it would like to see any provision for flexibility to be accompanied by adequate measures for accountability. Currently scant measures exist whereby senior staff members of the UN Secretariat can be held accountable for non-performance.
3. Proposals 20 to 21, which deal with governance in the Organisation, and propose to establish a small group of Member States to take decisions on behalf of the wider Membership. This small group is also referred to in proposals 22 and 23, which deal with the implementation of reforms in the Organisation. Proposals 20 and 21 also include the abolishment the Committee for Programming and Co-ordination.

These proposals would change the very nature of the United Nations, where each State has a possibility to participate and be involved in decision-making. At a time when there is a global concern about reforming governance and increasing democracy the UN would be moving in an opposite direction.

There was general agreement that the Secretary-General should submit three reports to elaborate on the majority of his proposals, such as on human resources management, procurement, outsourcing and information and communication technology.

There was a strong feeling among the G-77 that the European Union (EU), United States (US), Japan, and CANZ did not want to adopt a resolution in the Fifth Committee. They rather wanted to wait for the follow up report in May-June so that decisions would be taken in the context of the spending cap. (The spending cap was placed on the resources made available to the UN Secretary-General in the 2006/07 budget. At the adoption of the budget in December 2005, the US insisted on placing a spending cap on the budget made available to the UN Secretary-General as well as that the cap would only be lifted if sufficient progress was made on the issue of management reforms.)

Following intense efforts by South Africa as chair of the G77 to secure consensus on this decision, the G77 resolution was amended several times to reflect a number points on which agreement could be reached that resulted in two-thirds of the final resolution consisting of consensus language.
The US, EU, Japan and CANZ therefore called for a vote on the resolution which was subsequently adopted on 28 April 2006 by 108 votes against 50 with three abstentions.

Developments on the continent

Burundi

* We welcome the Palipehutu/FNL entering into unconditional negotiations with the government of Burundi.

* Minister of Safety and Security Charles Nqakula has been appointed as Facilitator to the Burundi Peace Process. Minister Nqakula undertook his first visit to the Great Lakes region last week Uganda, Tanzania and Burundi where he held discussions with all role-players regarding the Burundi Peace Process.

Democratic Republic of Congo

* The date for the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) first democratic elections in more than 40 years being finalised for 30 July 2006.
* South Africa contributes 1 409 troops to the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) led mission in the DRC.
* The mandate of MONUC has been extended until September 2006.
* In addition, South Africa has 124 troops in the DRC assisting in the registration of demobilised troops, assisting in upgrading the military centres in the country, etc. SA Cabinet recently extended the mandate of this component to March 2007. This is essentially a bilateral South African arrangement to help the new national army in the DRC.
* Following a United Nations’ request, the European Union has decided to deploy a German/French led EU Peacekeeping Force of 1 400 troops to the DRC to bolster security during the elections. Apparently, only 400-450 troops will apparently be based in Kinshasa while the rest will be based outside of the DRC, in one of the neighbouring countries still to be identified, as a rapid deployment force should there be violence during the elections. The Force will apparently be deployed two weeks prior to elections, and will remain in the DRC for a further four months.

Côte d’Ivoire

* Major strides being achieved in Côte d’Ivoire. However, it is a matter of concern that the national identification and disarmament processes are not being implemented.
* There is also growing concern that the October deadline for elections to be held will not be met.
* The seventh session of the International Working Group will be held on Friday 19 May 2006 in Abidjan. Minister Lekota will lead the South African delegation to this meeting.

Sudan/Darfur

* South Africa has 437 troops as part of the AU force in Sudan/Darfur.
* Abuja peace agreement:
The Government of Sudan and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) on Friday, 5 May 2006, following several extensions of the 30 April 2006 deadline, signed a peace agreement in Abuja, despite reservations on both sides over power sharing and security. Two rebel groups (a smaller faction of the SLM and the smallest group, the Justice and Equality Movement – JEM) rejected the accord.
The accord was brokered under the auspices of the African Union and is backed by the United States, the European Union (notably the UK), and the Arab League. The British Government sent International Development Secretary Hilary Benn to Abuja to support US Deputy Secretary of State for Defence Robert Zoellick in pressurising the parties to come to an agreement when the first deadline was missed.

Sudan

While progress has been made to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the situation had been complicated by the ongoing conflict in Darfur, which has spread to neighbouring states such as Chad, Cameroon and the Central African Republic (CAR). On 14 April 2006, the CAR closed its border with Chad. In this regard the international community has a mammoth task to avoid the reversal of the peace process gains by continuously engaging all parties involved in the CPA implementation and by supporting efforts directed towards post conflict reconstruction programmes in the Sudan.

The AU recently sent a "Mission of Information" to investigate armed clashes in Chad. There have been continuous reports of armed raids by Sudanese "Janjawhids" in the east of Chad. The Mission will also investigate the complicity of Sudan in the recent attack on the capital, N’djamena.

* AU Peace and Security Council meeting (Monday, 15 May 2006)
The Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) will be implemented from 18h00 GMT of Tuesday 16 May 2006

The SPLM/A group of Abdulwahid Al Nour and the JEM of Khalil Ibrahim will be encouraged to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement by 31 May 2006.

The current mandate of the African Mission in Sudan must be urgently reviewed particularly with regard to its strength and the additional tasks to be performed by the Mission in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.
Concern expressed about the precarious financial situation facing the African Mission in Sudan and appeal to AU partners to provide the necessary support to the Mission to allow it to continue to perform its mandate during the transition and to enable the AU to assume effectively its political role in the overall implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement.

With the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, concrete steps should be taken to effect the transition from the African Mission in Sudan to a UN peacekeeping operation.

Comores

* Presidential Elections were held on Sunday 14 May 2006.
* Ahmed Abdallah Sambi has been declared President-elect of the presidential elections. National election board has announced Sambi won 58,27% of the vote.
* South Africa is Chair of the Countries of the Region (South Africa, Kenya, Mauritius, Madagascar, Mozambique, Seychelles, and Tanzania).
* On the first of February 2006, a South African led AU Technical Team held a consultative meeting with the AU Peace and Security Directorate in Addis Ababa to accelerate the process of assisting the Comoros in preparation for the upcoming elections. Discussions centred on the need enhance electoral support; provide additional observers and the security issue of the elections.
* South Africa provides the largest troop contribution to AU Force deployed in Comoros - 680 SANDF troops were deployed as of 11 May 2006 to assist with the 14 May elections

The African Union Mission in Securing Elections in Comoros (AMISEC) Forces’ current composition is:

South Africa 350
Republic of Congo 5
Egypt 5
Nigeria 10
Mozambique 11
Mauritius/Madagascar 30 (policemen)
Total 411

South African Context

* 2010 Soccer World Cup

South Africa's progress in preparing for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in all its facets will continue to feature prominently in the run-up to the event. The 2010 FIFA World Cup has provided numerous opportunities in all spheres for fast tracking development programmes. The opportunity should be exploited maximally to ensure that the country reaps the socio-economic benefits that can accrue from the focus of the world on our nation and the African continent over the next five years.

The handover of the "World Cup Baton" by Germany to South Africa will be a major communication event, as will be the commencement of the building projects of the 2010 FIFA World Cup venues. The concept of the "African World Cup" will be finalised. The final 10 stadia that will be used to host the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa have been announced after submitted to and approved by FIFA on March 15, 2006. The finalisation of the contracts with the respected stadium owners has been achieved. An allocation of R242 million towards planning these stadia has been set aside by the government.

The official Emblem has been created and will be unveiled on July 07, 2006.
Legislation

The following pieces of legislation will be submitted to Cabinet in the course of the year:

2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA SPECIAL MEASURES BILL, 2006
South Africa provided FIFA with certain guarantees as part of its bid for hosting the 2010 FIFA World Cup. In order to facilitate these guarantees, South Africa is expected to introduce legislation that will remove any obstacles that may hinder their implementation. Two pieces of legislation have been identified, one a money Bill that will be sponsored by National Treasury and the other a Special Measures Bill that will deal with non-money matters. This Bill will be sponsored by Sport and Recreation South Africa.

The Special Measures Bill has already been forwarded to the relevant Cabinet Committee with contributions from all government departments who gave guarantees. It is envisaged that the legislation will be passed by 31 July 2006.

Crime Syndicates

* Of major concern to global security is the functioning and activity of crime syndicates, particularly the drug syndicates.
* South Africans are increasingly victims of such syndicates.

For a table on South African prisoners or detainees abroad contact the Department of Foreign Affairs.

International Context

Israel – Palestine

* The South African Government believes the resolution of the situation between Israel and Palestine is integral to securing world peace and security.
* We believe that there is a historic moment that exists with both Palestine and Israel having held free and fair elections in January and March 2006 respectively.
* The South African Government strongly supports that those who fight for the prevalence of democracy cannot challenge the outcomes of such processes when these do not suit us. In this regard, it is incumbent upon the international community to accept a Hamas led Palestinian government. At the same time, it is incumbent upon Hamas to accept the responsibility bestowed by the people of Palestine to create the conditions for peace and security within a stable state of Palestine to be realised.
* We will continue to work with both governments to assist in creating the political climate for dialogue between both sides that can lead to the creation of a secure State of Palestine and that of Israel living side-by-side within secure borders. We will continue to fight for the existence of a Palestinian state on the territories of the pre-1967 borders.

Iran

* South Africa is opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We believe that all countries that are in possession of these weapons should disarm through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty processes. We strongly support a nuclear free world.

We accept Iran’s right to have nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. However, there is great distrust about Iran’s intention. We therefore urge the Iranian government to finalise its negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The outstanding issues requiring finalisation are:

* All the nuclear material declared by Iran to the IAEA has been accounted for. Apart from the small quantities previously reported to the Board, the Agency has found no other undeclared nuclear material by Iran. Gaps do however remain in the Agency’s knowledge with respect to the scope and content of Iran’s centrifuge programme. Because of this, and other gaps in the Agency’s knowledge, including the role of the military in Iran’s nuclear programme, the Agency is unable to make any progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

After more than three years, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern. Any progress in that regard requires full transparency and active co-operation by Iran – transparency that goes beyond the measures described in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol.
We continue to interact with all role-players in this crisis in order to build confidence and trust.

There is no consensus among the Permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council in terms of sanctions against Iran.

The Russian Foreign Minister said, "We should not isolate Iran nor put pressure on them neither Russia nor China can support the language of a possible Security Council resolution which would include the pretext for coexcise or forceful actions."

Europe has announced a new plan to offer Iran nuclear technology if it stopped work on its uranium enrichment programme. China is reported to have reacted positively to this new initiative and called on all side to re-start negotiations. China said the EU plan should "promote the goal of non-proliferation and take into account the reasonable concerns of Iran."
Some members are asking for chapter 7 sanctions; some are adamant that no sanctions should be imposed. We are awaiting more details on the proposed sanctions measures being considered.

However we reiterate that all IAEA processes should be exhausted before the Security Council takes any decision on sanctions.

The latest report by the Secretary-General of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei is not all negative – we continue to call on all parties to support the IAEA processes. We do not believe that all avenues within the IAEA have been exhausted.

It is important to note that the entire region is very volatile and any actions that can increase tensions will lead to a very dangerous situation threatening world peace and security.

Questions and Answers

Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, regarding the Blue Helmeting of the African Mission in Sudan – has the resistance to this proposal by the Government of Sudan been overcome? There have also been reports of restrictions being placed by the French and German governments on the deployment of their troops. Is this correct?

Answer: It is correct that for various reasons, some countries did not support the conversion of the African Mission in Sudan to a United Nations operation. It was stated that this would be a good opportunity for foreign forces to carry out acts of terrorism against the blue-hatted forces.

While we acknowledge that this is a legitimate concern that must be taken into account, it has now been accepted by all parties that the African Mission in Sudan must be converted to a United Nations operation. While this is being prepared for, we call on the International community to strengthen the AU forces (AMIS) by providing financial and logistical support. We welcome the announcement of the USA and EU to help strengthen AMIS.

Regarding the area of deployment of European Union troops – this must be discussed with the UN, the AU, and the Sudanese Government.

Question: Deputy Minister Oosthuizen, do South African construction companies have the capacity to complete the required construction projects ahead of the 2010 World Cup? Will other projects be affected due to the 2010 World Cup?

Answer: As you know, the government has budgeted R242 million for stadia to be built and some to be refurbished ahead of the 2010 World Cup. We are convinced we have the capacity and the skills to deliver on this.

Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, some time ago you mentioned that the South African government would host a delegation from Hamas. Is there a date for this visit? Is there a reason the visit has not been confirmed?

Answer: This was a decision that the South African government would, in principle; meet with a Hamas led Palestinian government. As you know, President Abbas visited South Africa on the eve of the visit to the Middle East by Minister Kasrils and myself.

During his visit he extended an invitation to President Mbeki to visit Palestine and our visit was therefore postponed. At this time, although there are outstanding invitations for President Mbeki to visit Israel and Palestine, we as Foreign Affairs, are discussing with both governments and our Missions regarding the appropriate timing of this visit.

We do not believe that President Mbeki should visit the region for a visit’s sake – there should be a positive contribution to be made to creating the conditions for peace and security in the region.

If this is not possible, then we should visit as Foreign Affairs or even resurrect the visit of Minister Kasrils. We are under no illusion that we can add any new initiative. There is already the Arab League Plan and the Quartet sponsored Roadmap. What is now required is the political will to move on these initiatives.

Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, you have mentioned that elections in the DRC have been postponed for technical/logistical reasons. However, are you satisfied with the preparations for the elections thus far? Are you convinced the elections will go ahead this time?

Answer: The United Nations, the EU and Africa are investing significant resources in ensuring these elections do go ahead. We are, at the moment, in collaboration with the United Nations, assisting with the printing of ballot papers. This in itself is a mammoth task especially with the over 3000 candidates participating.

Question: Deputy Minister Oosthuizen, with regard the finalisation of agreements to build stadia and host matches – there is much debate as to Cape Town’s ability to host the semi-final match. Are negotiations ongoing in this regard?

Answer: It is indeed a privilege for any city to host matches. However, we are aware that stadia cannot be erected for only one match. I am aware of a provincial initiative that is underway to ensure that the city of Cape Town can host a successful event.

Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, is the South African government aware of the economic implosion in Zimbabwe? What is being done about it? Is the government having much success with regard to negotiations with the Zimbabwean government?

Answer: I must reiterate that we are involved bilaterally, through SADC and the AU and further field with trying to find a political solution to the situation in Zimbabwe.

We are aware of the economic deterioration in Zimbabwe and watch the situation with great concern – inflation has been reported at 1000% with predictions that this will increase. It is reported that there are at least two million undocumented Zimbabweans in SA.

The South African Embassy in Zimbabwe is also reporting that increasing numbers of Zimbabweans are seeking visas to enter South Africa.
We are in ongoing discussions with the government of Zimbabwe and opposition parties to assist them find a political solution to their political and economic challenges.

However, we have no illusions – no solution can be imposed on the Zimbabweans. They have to come together to negotiate a political and economic solution.

Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, the Israeli Ambassador to South Africa last week hinted that there was no role for South Africa to play in the Middle East. What is your interpretation?

Answer: President Mbeki has been invited by both the Israelis and Palestinians to visit the region. It is however the view of the Department of Foreign Affairs that this should not be a visit for the sake of visiting.

The visit must therefore be undertaken in full consultation with all role-players and in an attempt to share our experiences of transition to democracy.
We have also tried to share with both sides that there can be no political solution unless both sides accept the existence of a state of Israel behind secure borders and a viable Palestine State.

I am not aware of the Israeli Ambassador’s statement that SA has no role to play. He will have to explain this.

Question: Deputy Minister Pahad, what is the support of the United Nations General Assembly for the African position on Security Council reform?

Answer: This position was endorsed at the last African Union Summit. The Committee of 10 Heads of State that was reappointed at the last Summit has assured us of the support of other member states.

The resolution before the GA will give an indication of the support the AU position has. The matter will however be discussed at the next Summit.

Enquiries:
Ronnie Mamoepa
Cell: 082 990 4853

Issued by: Department of Foreign Affairs
17 May 2006