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"SOUTH AFRICA AND THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY (CTBT)"

Ladies and gentlemen,

1. I should like to talk to you about the role that South Africa and the African region are playing in the efforts to make the world safer for posterity and, in particular, the significance of the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (the CTBT).

2. The adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 September 1996 - by 158 votes to three against, with five abstentions - brought to an end one of the longest treaty negotiations in the history of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament. It took two and a half years of intensive effort to draft the Treaty text and its two annexes during the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. South Africa and other leading members of the Organization of African Unity (the OAU) who were at the time members of the Conference on Disarmament played a key role in steering those negotiations towards a positive outcome and to seeing that we have a strong Treaty. A preparatory process spanning almost 40 years, however, preceded the negotiations.

3. That process was initiated as early as 1954, when Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India proposed a so-called standstill agreement to suspend nuclear-weapon testing worldwide. This long preparatory process reflected all the major political developments since the early 1950s. In the shadow of the cold war, the lack of trust in the capabilities to monitor and verify adequately compliance with a comprehensive nuclear ban treaty was a major obstacle to any agreement. Limited success was achieved in 1963 when
the Partial Test Ban Treaty entered into force, which prohibited all nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. But not underground. It was only when the CTBT was adopted, 33 years later, that underground tests were finally banned.

4. The Treaty was not the only achievement of 1996. On 11 April 1996, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Pelindaba) was opened for signature at Cairo, which initiated the creation of a fifth nuclear-weapon-free zone. Furthermore, four nuclear-weapons States (China, France, the United Kingdom and the United States) took the step of signing Protocols 1 and 11 of the Pelindaba Treaty simultaneously with 45 African States that day. The Russian Federation signed these two Protocols later in
November 1996. (Signatories to Protocol 1 undertake not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosive device against any Party to the Treaty or against any territory within the zone for which a Party is internationally responsible; and signatories to Protocol 11 undertake not to test, assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the zone).

5. More recently, since the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia last year, the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO (CTBTO PrepCom) and other fora have called on India and Pakistan to join the CTBT regime. The Durban Declaration for the New Millennium, which was adopted by the Heads of State or Government of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in South Africa last September, for instance, "considered positively the commitment by the parties concerned in (South Asia) to exercise restraint .... and to
discontinue nuclear tests. They further stressed the significance of universal adherence to the CTBT, including by all Nuclear Weapon States".

6. So why is the CTBT significant? The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty bans all nuclear test explosions, for military as well as for civilian purposes. Article 1 of the CTBT on Basic Obligations foresees no compromises. It reads as follows :

"Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.

Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion".

7. The Treaty also provides for the establishment of a global verification regime - comprising an International Monitoring System; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures - to ensure the reliable detection and identification of any ambiguous events,
and to provide a credible deterrent to clandestine nuclear testing.

8. The global verification regime should be operational at entry into force of the CTBT. Therefore one of the main tasks of the Preparatory Commission is to build up the worldwide network of stations that comprise the International Monitoring System (IMS). This network of 170 seismological, 60 infrasound, 11 hydroacoustic and 80 radio-nuclide stations - supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories - will be capable of registering vibrations underground, in the sea and in the air as well as detecting traces of
radionuclides released into the atmosphere by a nuclear explosion. The stations will transmit a stream of data generated by these four complementary technologies, in near real time, via a global satellite
communications system to the International Data Centre within CTBTO PrepCom in Vienna, where all the data will be processed. All data, raw or processed, from the monitoring facilities will be made available to the States Signatories. There are provisions on consultation and clarification for dealing with ambiguous events. As a final verification measure, an on-site inspection may be requested.

9. South Africa is contributing four stations to the international monitoring system to verify compliance with the CTBT and will be taking joint responsibility with Germany for an auxiliary seismological station in Antarctica. Two seismological stations (a primary station at Boshof and an auxiliary station at Sutherland) already exist and are contributing data on a voluntary basis to the International Data Centre. The infrasound station, which will be co-located with the primary seismological station at Boshof,
will be installed later this year. As for the fourth station, which is a radionuclide station on Marion Island, a survey will be carried out later this year to determine the suitability of the site for monitoring
activities.

10. The radionuclide laboratory at the Atomic Energy Corporation at Pelindaba has been identified as a certified laboratory for the international monitoring system and will, on request, be contributing its
expertise to the System to supplement data drawn from the worldwide network of monitoring stations. The laboratory is also participating in sample analysis tests that CTBTO PrepCom is conducting this year. All the monitoring facilities will require the installation of satellite connections to enable them to relay their data in near real time to the International Data Centre in Vienna.

11. With its 152 States Signatories, the CTBT is approaching the status of a universal Treaty. Forty-two States, including 21 of the 44 countries with nuclear facilities whose ratification - under Article X1V - is necessary for the Treaty's entry into force have deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. South Africa was one of the 71 States to sign the CTBT on 24 September 1996, the day it was opened for signature. It was also the thirty-third signatory State (and
the first in Africa) to ratify the CTBT. (It deposited its instrument of ratification earlier this year on 30 March).

12. Currently, consultations are taking place in Vienna among the ratifying and signatory States regarding the convening of a Conference of the States that have ratified the Treaty three years after the date of the anniversary of its opening for signature. The Conference will take place in Vienna from 6 to 8 October this year. According to Article X1V of the Treaty, the purpose of the Conference is to consider and decide by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty.

13. The largest number of States signatories are in the African region. Thirty-nine out of 53 States have signed the CTBT and three have ratified : South Africa, Senegal and Mali. We are encouraging the other State signatories to follow suit. Four African countries belong to the group of 44 countries with nuclear facilities whose ratification is necessary for the Treaty's entry into force. They are, in addition to South Africa : Algeria; the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and Egypt.

14. Africa also has the largest number of States hosting monitoring facilities (24). Africa provided both the first Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, Ambassador Jacob Selebi of South Africa, and its current
Chairman, Ambassador Mokhtar Reguieg, of Algeria. Ambassador Selebi is now Director-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs and I am glad to have a friend at the top who is well placed to look after the interest of the Commission.

15. In addition, South Africa was the third State, after Canada and New Zealand, to sign a facility agreement authorizing work on its territory to establish or upgrade the monitoring facilities for the CTBT. Pending the conclusion of such agreements, an exchange of letters permits the Commission to carry out the necessary work in the meantime.

16. Turning to our organization, the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission started work at the Vienna International Centre on 17 March 1997. It is an independent international organization with its own membership and budget. The budget for 1999 is $74.7 million, over 70 per
cent of which has been paid; South Africa, I may say, always pays its dues on time! Considering that over 90 per cent of the 1998 budget has already been paid, our young organization enjoys a high degree of support from its member States.

17. With a staff of over 200 from some 65 States signatories (five staff members are from South Africa), CTBTO PrepCom has grown in numbers and functions. Its primary task is to build up the International Monitoring System according to a schedule of activities determined by its annual programme and budget. By this year, $57.5 million in capital investment had been budgeted for such activities, representing about 40 per cent of the total capital investment required to complete the monitoring network.

18. South Africa was the venue for the second Introductory Training Programme on the verification regime of the CTBT that we held in Pretoria in December 1997. We have since held two International Cooperation Workshops: one in Vienna last November and one in Cairo, at the beginning of June, for
countries of the African region. Through presentations by scientists and our staff, the participants learned more about the benefits of joining the Treaty and ways of maximizing those benefits at a regional level.

19. First and foremost, the Treaty advances the cause of international security by its comprehensive ban on explosive nuclear testing. Second, the Treaty establishes a comprehensive monitoring system to verify compliance. In establishing this system, our organization is equipping almost 90 countries with cost-free, cutting-edge technology, supporting the operation of their stations, and training their staff in processing, using and evaluating the data from the four verification technologies. And all the monitoring facilities will be owned and operated by the countries hosting or taking responsibility for them. However, the potential spin-off benefits arising from the CTBT verification technologies may be no less significant.

20. The CTBT and its verification regime are already proving their worth even before entry into force. It is taking effort, time and extensive resources but the arresting of horizontal as well as vertical proliferation
is an important step on the way to a nuclear-weapon-free world. And it is certainly a worthwhile enterprise for the planet as it enters the next century.

ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
12 AUGUST 1999

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