Appendix A: Indigenous systems of awards

This chapter provides a brief overview of a number of traditional forms of awards.

The Khoisan, AmaXhosa, AmaZulu, AmaNdebele, AbeSotho, A Vha Venda and other groups, as indigenous people of this country, represented a particular civilisation with distinct systems of awards which reflected the values of African society, during pre-and colonial times.

1. The Khoisan

The Khoikhoi (men of men) inhabited the area along the coastal strip, from the Kunene River in the west, to the Sundays River in the east. Some of the various Khoikhoi clans included the Cochoqua, Guriqua, Chainoqua and Hessequa.¹ The San inhabited much of southern Africa. The Khoi and San were pastoralists and hunter gathers respectively. The Khoisan occupied defined, but sometimes overlapping territories within which they often moved considerable distances according to the availability of grazing, game and seafoods. Culturally these two groupings had much in common. Their language was closely related. They shared the skills associated with a hunting-and-gathering way of life. Some of their religious beliefs were similar.

Their interaction with outsiders such as the white settlers and the AmaXhosa at times involved disputes over land and stock raiding. Seven years after the arrival of the Dutch settlers, the Cape witnessed the first Khoikhoi-Dutch war. In May 1659, the Khoikhoi under Doman suddenly attacked the Dutch in force. Doman was a Khoikhoi employed as an interpreter by the Dutch company. He had obvoiusly learnt to speak Dutch and had visited the Dutch holdings in Java. For that reason, Doman understood the Dutch intentions in the Cape. He then mobilised the Khoikhoi leaders and people to unite in an attack on the Dutch colony. The Dutch marksmen were consequently targeted by the Khoikhoi under Doman leaderships. The Khoikhoi took advantage of rainstorms and frustrated the operation of the colonists’ matchlocks. They concentrated on the Dutch’s food supply and also destroyed most of the colonists’ farms. They repossessed the bulk of the livestock.² The Khoisan did not have a formally organised military force. They nonetheless used their bows and arrows skillfully and displayed an incredible knowledge of their environment. They were well-known for their swift movements which made it difficult for enemies to capture them. They adapted to harsh arid conditions and were distinguished for their toughness and shrewdness.

The second Khoikhoi-Dutch war took place between 1673 and 1677. The Dutch had introduced a series of defensive measures such as watching houses and mounting patrols. Gonnema who was an influential chief of a subgroup of the Cochoqua, was the main opponent of the Dutch colonists. He was accused of instigating a series of attacks on them. The Dutch colonists, as farmers and traders were allegedly assaulted, others ambushed and killed by the Khoikhoi. The Dutch authorities responded by sending punitive expeditions against Gonnema. Gonnema used the 'guerrilla' technique of the San. He ordered his people to disperse their livestock and 'melt' into the bush when the Dutch expedition approached. This military strategy apparently worked, even though the Khoikhoi were eventually defeated. The war was ended in 1677 and peace was concluded with Gonnema.³

In 1799, the Khoikhoi expressed collective resistance against the expropriation of their cattle and grazing lands. They also resented the attempts of the colonists to render them servants in the territories which had once been theirs.

Even before the 1799 rebellion, fugitive Khoikhoi and bands of hunters waged a continuous struggle against the settlers. They captured or destroyed the settlers’ livestock. They burnt crops and razed the settlers’ farmhouses to the ground in the Nieuweveld Mountains and the Sneeuwberg. By 1795, it was reported that at least about 100 farms were rendered unoccupied. There were also raids and skirmishes in the vicinity of the Zwartberg, the Winterhoekberg and the Zwartkop River.⁴

In May 1799, the Khoikhoi, the Zuurveld AmaXhosa and the aggrieved ImiDange of Agter Bruintjies Hoogte, led a determined campaign to drive the Boers from the eastern district. After two months, the rebel Khoikhoi with their Xhosa allies were in control of the whole south–eastern portion of Graaf Reinet district, from Graaf Reinet to Algoa Bay and from Bruintjies Hoogte to the Zuurveld.⁵ The Khoikhoi rebels had a secure fixed base among AmaGqunukhwebe, between the Sundays River and Bushmans River. This security served to facilitate the centralisation of the Khoikhoi leadership, so that large numbers of them and combined groups of Khoikhoi and AmaXhosa were able to act in concert. This in turn also served to encourage those doubtful Khoikhoi who were still loyal to the settlers, to join the rebellion.⁶

Chungwa was a chief of AmaGqunukhwebe, an offspring of both AmaXhosa commoners and Gqunuqhwa Khoikhoi. Tshiwo, a Xhosa chief, is said to have proclaimed Khwane (Chungwa’s grandfather) a chief, after Khwane protected and safequarded Tshiwo’s clan during a conflict with Gaba, the leader of AmaNgqosini. Khwane was a famous warrior and a favourite councillor. He brought an army of about 100 young warriors, with spears, shields and war plumes. The army came from a community of wizards which Khwane was appointed to execute. He had saved their lives and at that critical occasion, Khwane used those 'so called' wizards to protect his chief, Tshiwo.

Chief Tshiwo then Wabanikela indwe yalomabandla bawaphetheyo. He conferred and adorned Khwane and the warriors with isithwalandwe, the crane feathers. This was a reward for outstanding bravery.⁷ During wars, the Gqunukhwebe warriors were usually drawn up in battle array and ornamented with crane feathers, the emblem of war.⁸

Abathwa (the San) were renowned for their skilful weapons. They made their weapons from special trees, bones and cattle hides. They peeled the trees skilfully, softened them and then wrapped them in cattle hides. The tip of the arrows was especially made of sharpened bones which was smeared with poison. This was done to inflict the victim with fatal wounds, irrespective of the size. Abathwa were knowledgeable of various poisons that they found from special roots and certain kinds of snakes. They also made knives, harmers, sticks and tips of their arrows from bones, horns and stones.⁹

During wars they were very alert. They were stout and broad in physical appearance. They had sharp and bright eyes and could see from very far. They also had high speed and were excellent runners. They fought to the end and would either be killed or would kill the enemy.¹⁰

In the absence of comprehensive research on the history and culture of the Khoisan, little is known about their heroes and heroines, their symbols and decorations which formed part of their system of awards. The Khoisan are among the people regarded as indigenous not only to South Africa but to the African continent.¹¹ For that reason, it is important to embark on thorough research into the their heritage, for inclusion in the new system of National Orders.

2. AmaXhosa

The AmaXhosa occupied the area that became known as the Eastern Frontier. All healthy adult males of the AmaXhosa were warriors. As boys, thy learnt to fight with sticks, to thrust, to parry and to throw at passing birds. As abafana (young men), they exchanged the sticks for different types of spears.

Young chiefs and their age mates, newly emerging from the circumcirsion lodge, tried to mark their coming of age by raiding neighbours or traditional rivals. As a result, raids and counter raids were frequent, but wars were relatively rare. A delegation of official representatives from the opposing parties was sent on a diplomatic mission to talk things over, before a war was imminent. Women were usually part of the delegation, when one of the parties seemed particularly dangerous or untrustworthy.¹²

When war was definitely imminent, the paramount or supreme chief dispatched imisila (official representatives) to the subchiefs of all the clans. Within a very short time, clansmen and clanswomen of that territory would be warned and informed that Ilizwe lifile (the country is dead), intimating that a state of war was prevailing.

Women also alerted the people by passing ixhwili, a sharp cry imitating a wild dog from ridge to ridge. In preparation, the warriors cleaned and sharpened their assegais. They then assembled at the Great Place where they were fed with specially slaughtered cattle. They sang war songs including Umhobe, the principal war song, and also danced. The warriors were then doctored by itola, the war doctor, and were organised into battle order.

The Xhosa war formation had a screen of ukhala (vedettes) in front. Ukhala was made up of younger warriors in ones or twos, who acted as eyes of the main body. Their responsibility was to locate the enemy and inform of the position and the strength of the enemy to the second screen, iintlola (scouts).

Iintlola were composed of small groups also of younger men. The intervals between these two groups were sufficiently close to communicate with each other. When the vedettes had informed the scouts about the enemy, they then passed that intelligence information on to the main body, umkhosi.

Umkhosi consisted of veterans who had had experience at war. These veterans were known as Amathwalandwe, wearers of the blue crane feathers. A head dress of this crane’s feathers was the distinctive mark of the veterans. Once the war started, the main army divided into three, a centre flanked by two wings known as intshinga and iqauke. The idea was to outflank the enemy with the object of either encircling or capturing cattle.

There was the iqopo (the reserves) under the immediate command of the supreme chief who was also commander in chief of the whole army. Finally, there was inkongo, a flying column at some distance. Its purpose was to protect the army from being attacked from the rear. By and large, the war was over as soon as one side broke and fled. The victors were then left to seize as many cattle as they could.¹³

4.1.1 System of awards

Isithwalandwe¹⁴

After war and during times of peace, the paramount chief assembled all the various divisions of his army. It was on this occasion that new and old warriors who had distinguished themselves with acts of bravery were honoured and awarded.

The feathers of the blue crane would be ready in front of the chief. He would call the distinguished warriors by their name. They would come forward and form a neat line and would then be seated next to the chief’s councillors.

The chief would talk generally about the war, the army’s preparedness, its mobilisation and the effectiveness of their weapons. He would refer to specific events that described the prowess demonstrated by the seated amaghwalande. He would mention those who sadly died in the war while fighting, to be also honoured with the blue crane feathers. The chief would praise the ancestors for guiding and protecting the army and all his subjects. Finally he would cap the warriors with the blue crane feathers.

Thereafter, cattle would be slaughtered to celebrate the victory of the army and also to restore harmony in that territory, itola would be busy examining the injured warriors and would treat their wounds. Finally, itola would attend to those who were regarded as cowards and there would be laughter, joy and happiness.¹⁵

Isinxiba mxhaga¹⁶

In addition to the decoration of feathers of the blue crane for distinguished warriors, there was also that of Mxhaga. The latter is an arm band made of ivory from the tusk of an elephant. Imixhaga¹⁷ were made by special people only at the royal kraal. They were given only by the supreme chief in his prerogative, to persons of considerable calibre.¹⁸ During special big occasions, the master of ceremony would begin his speech by addressing izinxiba mxhaga, referring to those honourable people.

The Isithwalandwe Award was introduced by the African National Congress (ANC) at the Congress of the People in 1955 to honour distinguished leaders and veterans. South Africans from all the various racial and ethnic backgrounds such as Trevor Huddleson, Yusuf Dadoo, Albert Luthuli, Moses Kotane, Oliver Tambo, Helen Joseph, Nelson Mandela, Harry Gwala, Ahmed Kathrada, Govan Mbeki, Raymond Mhlaba and so on, have received Isithwalandwe in recognition of their contributions to the struggle for democracy in South Africa. For that reason, the honouring of distinguished persons with Isithwalandwe could receive national recognition. Alternatively, the feathers of the blue crane could constitute part of the new imagery of bravery awards. Isinxiba mxhaga is also another possibility.

4.2 AmaZulu

AmaZulu occupied the area presently referred to as KwaZulu-Natal. The Zulu kingdom was characterised by specific African traditions of governance and rights whereby decision-making was by consensus. For example, King Dingane and his council of elders including Regent Mnkabayi had jurisdiction over all matters within the Zulu territory. The State often intervened in civil action likely to bring war.

Political power represented ancestral spirits of the kingdom. Mythology held that King Dingane’s ancestors such as Malandela and Senzangakhona, were the highest ranking. Both Dingane and Mnkabayi were the earthly representatives of the ancestors. Regent Mnkabayi assumed the role of the 'spiritual' leader of the Zulu army, impi. She addressed the impi as part of the kingdom’s ritual before it engaged itself with the enemy. The king could not exercise his patriarchal power without invoking Regent Mnkabayi’s spiritual powers. After visiting Regent Mnkabayi and before ambarking on a military campaign, the impi, utterly invisible sped away to victory.

King Shaka’s reign was also marked by a dramatic transformation of the old gentlemanly military conventions. Shaka invented a whole new system of fighting. He devised probably the first-ever standing army founded in our century. It comprised about 10 000 to 15 000 soldiers, amabutho. It was divided into regiments, with further subdivisions and sections.

Shaka’s natural military acumen and genius was applied in devising military strategies when waging war. He divided the Zulu army into three main divisions. Isifuba, the centre contained the veteran regiments who bore the brunt of the fight. The two supporting wings termed izimpondo zenkomo (bull’s horns) consisted of the more agile and fiery younger men. A fourth body of amabhubesi, the lions, was kept in reserve. The izimpondo zenkomo warriors were sent out for the purpose of encircling or circumventing the enemy.

The weapons carried in the earlier pre-Shakan times were the hurling spears and javelin type called isiJula. These weapons tended to expose the warriors for if one had missed the target, one was defenceless without a weapon. It was also difficult to retrieve the weapon from the enemy’s territory. King Shaka thus introduced close quarters, a frontal system of attack. This ushered in the heavy bladed iklwa spear and untlekwana, a smaller version. Iklwa had a blade some 18 inches long by one and a half wide, mounted on a thick shaft half two and a feet long. Wielded overarm, the stabbing motion was awkward and weak, but thrust underarm, with the body weight behind it, iklwa was extremely powerful. Shaka also increased the size of the shield, making it large enough to shelter the whole body behind. With practise, shield and spear were used together in effective combat. The greater the battle experience, the lighter the colour of the ox-hide shields carried. Shaka is thus acknowledged as one of the most brilliant military strategists of the past two centuries.

The role of women in inspiring bravery, as in the case of Regent Mnkabayi, has been significant. It denotes both inspiration and caring. The izimpondo zenkomo was also a significant military innovation during King Shaka’s reign and had a profound impact on military strategy in years to come.

4.3 AmaNdebele

'Ndebele' has come to be used as a reference to three African groups which not only evolved historically independent of each other; but are also culturally and linguistically distinguishable from each other. The three groups are the Ndebele who were led by Mzilikazi out of Natal in the early 1820s, through the Transvaal to Southern Rhodesia; the Southern Ndebele who claim descent from one Musi who lived in the Pretoria area long before the Mzilikazi migrations; and the more Sothoised, Northern Ndebele, who are also known as the 'Ndebele of Langa'. What the three groups have in common is their Northern Nguni origin and their settlement in parts of the Transvaal which, exposed them to Sotho-Tswana influence. However, the three groups did not originate from same Northern Nguni source, nor did the Sotho-Tswana influence impact on them in an undifferentiated manner. These factors, therefore, make it almost impossible for one to talk of the 'Ndebele' as if they are a single, distinguishable group such as the 'Pedi' or the 'Zulu'.

Mzilikazi ka Khumalo broke away from Shaka around 1823 with a following of some 300 young warriors and women. He crossed the Drakensberg to settle along the Olifant River at what he called ekuPhumeleni ('The Place of Rest'). In 1825, he left the latter for the area along the Apies and the Crocodile rivers, where he built enDinaneni, enKungwini and enHlahladlela as his three military kraals. Because of pressure from the Sotho-Tswana, the Griquas, as well as the Zulu led by Dingane, Mzilikazi was forced to abandon his settlement by the end of 1832, and drifted westwards to settle in the Hurutse area along the Marico River at Mosega and eGabeni. The final major move occurred when the Voortrekker farmers, together with their African allies, attacked Mzilikazi in November 1837, and forced him to cross the Limpopo to settle in what later became Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).

One’s mobility and position in the Ndebele society was mediated by this nzansi-hole-enhla hierarchy. The Ndebele military hierarchy was also affected. The king (inkosi) was at the apex as the commander-in-chief. Below him was the umnumzane who included members of the royal family; then came the induna who were commoners with military officer rank and were reponsible for the administration of different parts of the kingdom; then came the mantoto who were the married, veteran soldiers; then there were the machacha who were regarded as the invincible soldiers who had to distinguish themselves in battle before being allowed to get married; and at the bottom were the matsetse, the youth who tended cattle. One’s age and ethnic origin somehow determined one’s location in this hierarchy.

The Ndebele of Mzilikazi adopted some aspects of Shaka’s ibutho system which in turn adapted to their experience and history. The Ndebele sense of ibutho had both military and masculine connotations; but the army was a temporal institution which melted away after a military engagement. But the ibutho could also be a new village in the making. The formation of the Ndebele ibutho went through four stages. The first stage was when young men (amajaha) were brought from existing imizi (homesteads) to form an ibutho; during the second stage this newly formed ibutho assumed the character of an offensive and defensive military unit; the third stage was when the members of this ibutho were allowed to return to their imizi to take wives to bring to the ibutho; and in the final stage, the ibutho became an umuzi, assuming the latter’s reproductive functions and creating a nucleus for the emergence of a new isigaba (a subdivision of the kingdom) under a new chief.

The small group which followed Mzilikazi in 1823 was made up of two major proto-amabutho known as Amakanda and Amahlope. By the late 1820s, the former had subdivided into smaller amabutho which included the Nxa and Ndinana, while the Amahlope gave rise to others such as the Isizinda, Magolosa and Dibinhlangu. These amabutho became the social and military basis on which the Sotho-Tswana were incorporated into the Ndebele polity. This process of the subdivision and the emergence of new amabutho from the Amakanda and Amahlope continued, and by the 1830s other groupings such as Insinda, Insinga, Nzwananzi and Dhodhlo were in existence.

The Amnyama and the Igapha were the two other pro-amabutho of Mzilikazi. The Amnyama, regarded as the 'sons of Amakanda-Amahlope', were formed as a result of the tension between Mzilikazi and Shaka, and were reputed to have produced the amaqawe (brave warriors) such as Mahubohubo of Intunta and Dambisamahubo of Gohlwayo. By the 1830s, the Amnyama had given rise to other amabutho such as Mzinyati, Eyengo, Dukada, Matshetshe, Godhlwayo, Nkenenkene and Isiphezi.

Igapha, named after the 1835-37 capital of Mzilikazi of eGabeni, was made up of recruits from the Amakanda. Amhlope and Amnyama. The Igapha followed Mzilikazi to Rhodesia and later developed offshoots such as Amagogo, Nqama and Nyamandlovu.

The best-known Ndebele leaders are, of course, Mzilikazi and his successor, Lobengula. Mncumbathe, also known as Nombati, was Mzilikazi’s best-known councillor and emissary. Mncumbathe led Mzilikazi’s most important missions, which included the 1829 visit to the Robert Moffat mission station at Kuruman to initiate contact with whites, and the 1835-36 delegation to sign a treaty with the British. Mncumbathe also became a regent following Mzilikazi’s death in 1868 before Lobengula took over two years later. Kaliph or Mkalipi was Mzilikazi’s top-ranking military officer during the Transvaal settlement; and Gundwane Ndiweni is best remembered for having led a section of the Ndebele across the Limpopo without Mzilikazi.

From the above account, the Ndebele military regiments such as Amnyama, Igabha and their commanders such as Mahubohubo of Intunta and Dambisamahubo of Godhlwayo, as well as the men who led the Ndebele polity such as Mkalipi, Gundwane Ndiweni, form part of the diverse history of military and civilian bravery.

4.4 The Northern Sotho/Modjadji/Sepedi

The complexity of pre-colonial African nation-states/kingdoms must be appreciated. Groups such as the 'Pedi' and the 'Lobedu' can therefore not be reified and fixed into some frozen, homegenous and one-dimensional entities. Such an approach will play in the hands of those who sought 'tribes' among what were culturally complex pre-colonial African societies. African pre-colonial kingdoms, the Lobedu and Pedi in this case, were a product of migrations and concomitant military conquests.

The internal architecture of African societies must also be borne in mind; notably, the social stratification which was mediated by age, sex and lineage affiliation. In most cases, if not all, the rituals and symbolism associated with military activity reflected this stratification, and had as its objective the legitimisation of the hegemonic lineage group and its inner, royal circle in particular.

While women and cadets were considered minors and precluded from entering the public domain, for example, chiefs were, for their part, regarded as representatives of the ancestors on earth.

There appears to have been no distinct system of military awards among the Pedi/Lobedu in the manner this occurred in Europeon societies. The recognition of and rewards for one’s display of bravery and courage were part of a complex ritual practice which permeated different levels of those societies. In fact, bravery and courage were the essential ingredients of the Pedi’s conception of manhood, and thus constituted the basis for the socialisation of every male youth.

The Pedi society was not as militarised as the Zulu were, but preparation for war was indeed part of the socialisation of every male youth. War could be caused by competition over land and water, or stock-theft accusations. Even though wars were fairly common, the Pedi, unlike the Zulu, depended more on surprise attacks and diplomacy just like the Sotho of Moshoeshoe. In fact, what were memorable intra-African battles lasted only a few hours, with very few warriors falling in the process.

In their socialisation for war, the male youth were organised into regiments corresponding to the initiation (koma) age grades. Each regiment was placed under the leadership of a son associated with the royalty who was given a copper-made identification disc which he wore around his neck or hair during battle. When war was decided upon by the chief, all men were summoned to the royal court (moshate) by a war-horn (phalafala) made out of the horn of an antelope.¹⁹ A sefoka, a plumed staff made of black ostrich feathers, was carried to the battlefield. Each warrior, for his part, carried a leather shield (kotsi), assegai (lerumo), club (molamu) and a battle-axe (selepe), whose blade conformed in appearance to the copper disc worn by the regiment leader. These weapons were treasured and passed down from father to son. Brave warrior were known as ba bolaileng dithwene, literally meaning 'those who have killed monkeys'.

The chief was a commander-in-chief of the army, but delegated some of his battle functions to a close relative who would act as the leader of war (molaodi wa ntwa). No special medals were awarded after the battle except for the loot which was distributed among the warriors by the chief. This loot consisted mostly of cattle, women and children: 'All cattle looted, which are called mathupjoa, were handed to the man in command, who caused a third to be slaughtered, a third to be sent to the chief’s kraal, and the remaining third to be handed back to the party who looted them. Women and children were also regarded as loot and were divided amongst the followers of the chief'.²⁰

For those warriors who killed an enemy soldier during the battle, a special cleansing ritual was held, not least because some members of the two fighting groups could have been related through marriage or otherwise. This ceremony, known as dijo tsa dinong (meal of the eagles):

… consisted of small pieces of fried meat being placed in a conically shaped lid (morufisi), from which the warriors had to eat with their hands tied behind their backs and their ankles tied together. As the lid rests on a small surface which makes it unstable, the men had to hop around like eagles to get the meat with their mouths… It is said that it [the ritual] would strengthen the participants against all dangers from the spirits of the deceased foe.²¹

Besides the actual war, the Pedi had symbolic practices (dika) which were intended for their protection against an enemy. One of such old practices was the seotlo which involved the erection of a heap of debris and stones at the roadside to prevent the enemy from using that particular road. The rural Limpopo has many of such heaps of stones littered across its landscape. Another practice consisted of the placing of a doctored stick (lepheko) across a cross with the belief that this would protect the village from an epidemic or disease affecting the neighbourhood.²²

The Pedi practice totemism which links certain lines of ancestral descent with particular animal species. Each grouping venerated an object or animal with which its founding forefather was associated, and called itself after such an object or animal. Not only was the totem never supposed to be killed or eaten, but various rituals such as dances were performed in the honour of the revered object object or animal. The core of the Pedi has a noko (porcupine) as its totem while the Lobedu are known as the 'wild pigs' (kolobe). Other totems associated with various Pedi groups include kwena (crocodile), kgomo (beast/cow), nkwe (leopard), tau (lion), phuti (duiker), pudi (goat) and tlou (elephant).²³

Royalty

Some aspects of the Pedi royalty have relevance for a discussion of the symbolism around bravery and courage. The founders and great leaders of the Pedi nation [i.e. Thulare (d. 1824), Sekwati (d.1861) and Sekhukhuni (d. 1882)] as well as Sekhukhuni’s regiment, Matuba, together with Mogokgomeng, a place where Sekhukhuni’s lodge was located for his initiation in 1826, deserve recognition in the history of bravery. 'Modjadji'" can be used to honour female leaders who demonstrate courage and bravery.

The chief’s royal insignia is also of some relevance . With his body covered in leopard-skin, a chief wore pheta ya thaga (royal beads) around his neck and loins. As shown already, a sefoka was part of the royal gird. In fact, ostrich feathers were highly prized among the Africans and were used among the Sotho-Tswana for the decoration of the chief. A pitsi (zebra-skin) was used as a royal mat. All these items were very ancient, having being passed down from father to son. There were also some items with a magical value. One of these was a mohlare, a tree whose branches grate and cross against one another to produce a particular sound.

Attempts to indigenise the system of National Orders requires an appreciation of the fact that the recognition of bravery and courage among the Pedi was not only part of the upbringing of each Mopedi youth, but was also part of a complex ritual practice which permiated different levels of the Pedi society.

The sefoka was the most commonest form of award among the Pedi, but this was in no way confined to bravery and courage; manhood and loyalty to the ruling lineage were also important considerations. A sefoka also symbolised the Pedi nation and chieftainship, being carried to war and worn by chiefs as one of the items associated with their office.

4.5 VhaVenda

The VhaVenda of today are descendants of many heterogeneous groupings such as VhaNgona, VhaSenzi, VhaMbedzi, VhaNyai, VhaLemba, VhaTavhatsindi, VhaFamadi, VhaLea, VhaLuvhu, VhaTwamamba, VhaNzelele and VhaGoni.²⁴ The various groupings amalgamated into a distinct ethnic group – VhaVhenda, with a common language and culture. The VhaLemba have been an exception, with a distinct culture, but share the VhaVenda language. The fusion occurred as a result of military conquest, subjugation, intermarriage, assimilation and acculturation. The VhaVenda have strong historical links with the Sotho and the Shona of Zimbabwe.

The dominant source of conflict which led to the division of the VhaVenda kingdom was rivalry within the royal family over succession to the throne. After the death of a chief, VhaVenda chiefs were prone to factionalism. This often resulted in a proliferation of independent chiefdoms and violent confrontations. Subsequently, their monarchy was not as united and consolidated, particularly against colonial invasion.

According to VhaVenda oral tradition, their chiefs had a magic drum known as Ngomalungundu. The latter was a sacred drum of Mwali, the heavenly God of VhaVenda. VhaSenzi brought it from the north and called it the drum of their God. Ngomalungundu was the spear and shield of VhaSenzi. Their king is believed to have worked miracles with this drum which had magic and killing powers. In fear of Ngomalungundu, other groupings surrendered to or fled from the killing powers. Through assimilation and acculturation all VhaVenda came to revere and fear this greatest musical instrument. They regarded this drum as the Voice of their Great God (Mambo wa Denga), the Lord of all their ancestor spirits, the instrument of the Royal Ancestral spirits. Ngomalungundu was known everywhere in Venda and was regarded as the salvation of VhaVenda. ²⁵

VhaVenda were stone-builders and their villages were structured in such a way that strangers or enemies could easily get lost. Their walls were high with loopholes through which spears could be thrust. The villages were build in inaccessible places for protection. VhaVenda chiefs were associated with lions and leopards which guarded the sacred groves.²⁶ A leopard skin as a form of royal tribute was given to the superior chief by the inferior chief during raids.²⁷ Thohoyandou, meaning the head of the elephant, is important in Venda symbolism.

Thohoyandou was the king of the last groups of immigrants to arrive in Venda, the VhaSenzi and VhaLemba. They descended to the Nzhelele Valley. Thohoyandou is believed to have conquered and absorbed the inhabitants there with the help of Ngomalungundu. He established an empire-like structure and his hegemony covered the area from Zambezi to the modern Pietersburg. Dzata was the capital of Venda. Thohoyandou disappeared mysteriously into the unknown and was the last of the kings to have ruled a united Venda kingdom.

4.5.1 Heroes: Makhado and Mphephu

Makhado, Davhana, Khangale and Nthabalala were the sons of Chief Ramabulana. Davhana was the eldest son and should have taken over the reign. Makhado was the one who assumed the reign of the Ramabulana chiefdom, with the assistance of Makhadzi Nyakhulu. He was considered to be brave and was the most popular among his brothers. The Boers had become embroiled in internal Vha Venda dynastic struggles. They opposed the succession of Makhado and supported Davhana who was the rival claimant, in an endeavour to stamp their authority over VhaVenda.

When the Transvaal Republic (ZAR) authority sent the personnel of the Location Commission to take census, to count huts and to collect taxes from VhaVenda, Makhado refused them access to his terrain. Paul Kruger arrived with Boer reinforcements in 1867 and sent a delegation of Boers to negotiate with Chief Makhado. Makhado responded by sending a group of young boys. The Boers were insulted and interpreted this response as a sign of contempt.

Makhado defended VhaVenda territory with his battalions. The Manenu battalion, which was the strongest, was situated at Tshianane, north of Soutpansberg. The warriors of Manenu were popular for their fighting prowess. They used spears, battle axes, bows and arrows as their weapons. The shield was the symbol of this battalion, symbolising the safeguarding of their chiefdom and VhaVenda.

The Maunavhathu battalion was situated at the present Vuwani area. The Maunavhathu warriors were known for their fearlessness and ruthlessness. The Mavhoi was a senior battalion. It formed part of the security at Chief Makhado’s kraal. This battalion collected all the spears from the defeated enemies.²⁸

The gulf between the Boers and VhaVenda widened and war became imminent. Paul Kruger sent a group of Boers to the royal kraal of chief Makhado, in another attempt to re-establish the ZAR’s authority over VhaVenda. Makhado demanded the release of his elder brother Davhana who was arrested and accused of stealing cattle. This incident aggravated the tension between the two groups. Finally, the prowess of the VhaVenda forced the Boers under Kruger to withdraw from Soutpansberg and abandon their settlements in VhaVenda on 15 July 1867. Makhado’s battalions besieged Schoemasdal and set it on fire that evening. Makhado was nicknamed Tshilwavhusika meaning 'Night Fighter' of Ramabulana. He was popularly known as the 'Lion of the North', and his warriors were also known as the 'powerful ones'.

Makhado was allegedly poisoned and died in 1895. His sons Maemu, Mphephu and Sinthumule also fought over the throne. Makhadzi Ndalammbi, Makhado’s sister favoured Mphephu. She and other relatives believed that Mphephu had an undisputed right of succession to the throne. Mphephu thus took over the throne.²⁹

The Boers disapproved of Mphephu’s succession to the throne and refused to recognise him as the chief of the VhaVenda. By this time, they had re-occupied Soutpansberg and were attempting to stamp down their authority, once again. They continued sending members of the Location Commission to take census, count huts, collect tax, and erect beacons in Mphephu’s residence. Misunderstanding between Mphephu and the Boers culminated in the 1898 war.³⁰

Internal squabble within the royal family contributed to the defeat and final subjugation of Vha Cenda in the 1890s. Mphephu clashed with his other brother Sinthumule. Manipulation from the respective relatives fueled this clash. Finally, a war broke out between Mphephu’s age group known as Mavhegwa and Sinthumule’s age group known as Ngomakhosi.

Sinthumule sought military assistance from other VhaVenda chiefs. They refused on the grounds that he and mphephu were one family. He also sought help from the Boers who were happy to oblige as they perceived Mphephu as a scourge. In 1898, the Boers finally conquered and subjugated the VheVenda. Mphephu fled with many of his followers and crossed the Limpopo into Shona territory.³¹

The sacred drum Ngomalungundu, symbolised the salvation of VhaVenda. It was regarded as the spears and shield of their kingdom. Chief Makhado is one of the heroes of VhaVenda. He defeated the Boer reinforcements under Paul Kruger in 1867 and defended VhaVenda independence with his numerous battalions. Suggestions have been made that Makhado should be honoured as a national hero.³²

VhaVenda chiefs were associated with lions and leopards which guarded their sacred groves. Makhado was known as the 'Lion of the North. Powerful chiefs were given leopard skins as a form of royal tribute during battles. Lions and leopards were therefore powerful military symbols representing the prowess of VhaVenda.

4.6 The liberation struggle

4.6.1 Introduction

The struggle for liberation dates back to the first encounter between foreign and indigenous people in South Africa. This section does not attempt to present a history of the liberation struggle; rather it points out salient aspects of the liberation struggle which have a bearing on National Orders.

The discussion is confined to the two organisations which broadly constitute the liberation movements for two reasons. Firstly, they broadly represent the aspirations of the majority of people with respect to African emancipation, justice, democracy and non-racialism. Secondly, both the ANC and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) instituted some form of awards which could be considered in revising the table of precedence, and/or making provisions to officially recognise their forms of honours and awards. As the mandate of the Advisory Council on National Orders indicated, there was a need to capture the histories of indigenous and liberation forms of awards in some part.

Aspects covered in this section include the origins of the political movements, the form of awards instituted by the liberation organisations, symbolism, the process of nomination and criteria for nomination.

4.6.2 Origins of the African National Congress

The ANC was founded in 1912. The primary aim of the organisation was to weld together the scattered local and provincial African organisations concerned with liberation from white domination into one national body. The idea was to provide Africans with a united voice. African unity was seen as essential to gaining some form of representation in the ‘Whites’ only union of South Africa, which had been formed in 1910.

According to Pixley ka Isaka Seme, chief among four founders, all of whom were lawyers, the ANC was to be an ‘open’ body, without sinister motives, seeking to ascertain views and openly submit grievances to the Government for discussion and redress.

John Dube, elected first President of the ANC, observed that Africans were approaching the Government not with assegais but respectfully as loyal subjects, with the intention of airing their grievances and removing the obstacles of poverty, prejudice and discriminatory legislation.

Until the 1940s, the form of action or opposition to the government was through resolutions, protests, propaganda, deputations, and distribution of literature. By 1941 the ANC was speaking explicitly of the right of franchise for all Africans. It also included in its policy the demand for the presentation of Africans in all government departments.

Founded in 1944, the ANC Youth League adopted African nationalism as the national liberating creed. Its long-term goal was ‘true democracy’. Its immediate goal of its potential action was ‘direct representation of Africans in Parliament on a democratic basis’. 'Freedom in our Lifetime' was the League’s motto. The mode of action expressed in the Programme of Action (1949) had three practical consequences: a new approach in communicating with authorities; more co-operation with other Black organisations; and more aggressive campaigning for political and social change.

In 1950, the ANC launched a campaign of mass action against the pass laws in the Defiance Campaign. In 1955, the ANC convened the Congress of the People (attended by thousands), which drew up the Freedom Charter, the first non-racial charter of democracy.

Having been frustrated at working for peaceful change, and their organisation having been outlawed, some leaders of the ANC felt that there was no alternative but to resort to underground means namely, some form of violence. Umkhonto We Sizwe (MK), Spear of the Nation, was established in 1961 and openly linked to the ANC by ANC-exiled leaders in 1963. The internal operations of MK were short-lived. Within a year and a half of its announced existence, its hideout in Rivonia, Johannesburg, was raided by the police.

Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)

For over 33 years, the ANC’s military wing MK led the armed struggle against Apartheid. It stimulated militant anti-Apartheid organisations and popular struggles since the Soweto uprising in 1976, and helped bring South Africa to negotiated settlement. MK’s war was raged under some of the most difficult conditions ever encountered by a revolutionary movement. MK cadres have many stories of considerable heroism and fortitude in the face of extreme hostile odds, and brought a close to the chapter of white minority domination and long resistance, initially through peaceful non-violent means, but later through revolutionary violence.

Since its inception by the ANC, on 16 December 1961, MK has been a political army. The form of the armed struggle at the time of its inception was mainly armed propoganda - targets being mainly the sabotage of electricity pylons and other infrastructure. The sabotage operations were executed mainly by cadres who had some prior engineering knowledge and could manufacture explosive devices. Shortly after the armed struggle, the leadership was arrested at Liliesleaf farm in Rivonia (headquarters of MK), and the subsequent trial resulted in life sentences for the entire leadership, including Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu. The need to establish MK as an externally based army became imperative. Attempts were made in 1967 to establish an alliance between the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwean People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) and MK. MK wanted to proceed through Rhodesia’s Matabeleland and into South Africa. The objective was never realised. The Luthuli Detachment, as the MK unit that took part in the campaign became known, had among its members Chris Hani, as well as Joe Modise, who later became the Minister of Defence³³ in the democratic South Africa.

On 25 April 1969, the Morogoro Conference was convened to address the problem of political lull in South Africa, as well as the growing discontent within the ranks of the ANC and MK about the harsh conditions of exile life. The Revolutionary Council was established, emphasising the need for better politically and military trained cadres. A machinery (organisation) was created to deal with internal reconstruction and propaganda, and the bulk of the resources were dedicated to work in South Africa. The problem still had to be overcome of reaching the front areas. Communication was therefore established between external centres and the ‘home front’.

Concerted moves were made to establish an underground presence in South Africa through propaganda and the infiltration of legal trade unions. In the meanwhile, the region had also changed following the coup in Portugal. During the pro-Frelimo rallies in 1974, black university students demonstrated in support of the Mocambican liberation movement, and the crises besieging the colonial Portuguese regime. In the years after 16 June 1976 riots, several thousand of youths fled the country and joined the ranks of MK. To a lesser extent, some also joined the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) and the PAC.

The second major wave of recruits to MK joined in the mid-1980s, fuel led the Vaal uprising in September 1984. This signalled what was to come when the country was engulfed by mass protest triggered by rent and service boycotts. It was also the period when the ANC strategy of a 'people’s war', whose primary objective was to involve the entire populace in the fight against Apartheid, got under way and this coincided with the government’s introduction of the Black Local Authorities Act. MK experienced phenomenal growth. The people’s war called for the isolation of members of the security forces and officials serving in local authorities, or any persons perceived to be working for the Government. The period also saw the rise of the United Democratic Front whose objectives was to campaign against the new Constitution establishing the tricameral parliament and black local authorities.

MK grew numerically and qualitatively with a different type of youth baptised by the struggle of the mass democratic organisations. Their experience of mass organisations resulted in a higher level of political consciousness than among their predecessors. As a result, MK had to secure and expand training facilities. Additional training camps in Angola were opened. Strategies were employed to influence events on the ground in South Africa and make the presence of MK felt. MK numbers multiplied within South Africa. Operations at this stage still concentrated on sabotage and included the 1980 Sasol oil refinery, the Voortrekkerhoogte rocket attack in 1981, the Koeberg nuclear power station sabotage in 1982, and the 1983 car bomb explosion outside the SA Airforce Headquarters in Church Street, Pretoria. This marked a shift to a more frontal than symbolic approach in MK’s strategy.

The Kabwe Consultative Conference, held in 1985, reappraised the strategy of people’s war and making the country ungovernable. Following the Conference, there was a notable increase in rural incidents, with landmines being detonated by vehicles, while others were lifted by security forces. The choice of white farms in rural areas were premised on the fact that farmers were seen as legitimate targets who supported Apartheid and formed part of the security forces' rural commandos. The mobilised masses were defined as a ‘political army’, and the armed component as the ‘revolutionary army’.

The national State of Emergency, imposed on South Africans on 12 June 1986, dampened mass resistance, and resulted in the detention of thousands of activists. However, the number of operations between 1986-88 still increased until in 1989. The ANC and MK were unbanned in February 1990. Many MK cadres were outside South African borders, an ‘army in exile’.

The task to negotiate a new national defence force was the responsibility of the Sub-council on Defence (SCD), a substructure of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). For the purpose of co-ordinating, the Joint Military Co-ordinating Council (JMCC) was established. Protracted negotiations resulted in the short-lived formation of the National Peacekeeping Force (NPKF), essentially made up of defence and police forces of parties participating in the TEC.

4.6.3 Origins of the Pan-Africanist Congress

The ascendancy of the National Party in 1948 angered the militant nationalists within the ANC and caused the breakaway of the PAC in 1959, with the emergence of Mangaliso Sobukwe as a leader.

The PAC was formally launched in April 1959. Mangaliso Sobukwe, lecturer in African Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand, was elected president. The long-term goal of the PAC was reflected in the phrase ‘Africa for Africans’. The slogan represented the political goal of a government ‘of the Africans by the Africans’.

The word ‘African’ was given a wider significance here that its usual connotation. In the new Africa it would refer to ‘everybody who owes his loyalty only to Africa and accepts the democratic rule of an African majority’. The PAC conceived the struggle in Pan-Africanist terms rather than exclusively South African. The ideal South Africa, and consequently the rest of the continent, would guarantee no minority rights. Individuals, rather than groups, would be recognised. A guarantee of individual liberties was seen as the highest guarantee necessary.

The PAC had made no prior commitment to either violence or non-violence as a suitable form of strategy. Given the brutal repression of peaceful demonstrations, the PAC assumed a militant stance of resistance, especially after government action had suppressed the peaceful Sharpville demonstrations in 1960. Poqo, a para-military wing of the PAC was established in Cape Town in 1960. Poqo was organised into groups or cells to hit back at regime brutality. The PAC also established a military wing, Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA).³⁴

APLA

The PAC’s exile leadership was formally constituted in August 1962 when a presidential council was established under the leadership of Potlako Leballo. Between 1962-64 Maseru was the headquarters for the PAC. Other offices were opened in London, Accra, Francistown, Cairo, Dar-es-Salaam, and later Lagos .³⁵

Between 1962 and 1964, APLA prepared themselves for guerrilla warfare. APLA received military training at the FNLA’s Kinkuzu camp, in the Congo. Conditions in the camp were harsh and a number of cadres perished from fever. APLA operated within Angola during this time and by May 1964, the Kinkuzu trainees were returned to Dar-es-Salaam. In August 1964, the APLA headquarters was moved to Dar-es-Salaam. In the next period, military recruits were trained in Ghana, while closer relations were developed with China.

In September 1967, a leadership conference was convened in Tanzania to restructure the high command and improve the representation of guerrilla units. The Presidential Council was replaced by a Revolutionary Command and its headquarters re-established in Lusaka in December 1967. In 1968, an APLA unit was despatched to Mozambique to work with the Corema guerrillas. Their mission was to sabotage the Beira oil pipeline to Rhodesia. The APLA/Corema group survived in Mozambique for two months and was then intercepted, some arrested and some killed. Those arrested were handed over the South African authorities, but two managed to escape and return to Zambia.

In 1972, the PAC advocated a strategy of rural popular insurgency. A number of PAC guerrillas were stationed in the ZAPU training camp and underlook joint incursions against the Rhodesian forces. In the late 1970s, Chinese instructors provided military training to APLA recruits at Chunya in Tanzania.

Between 1971 and 1975, APLA made various efforts to secure a route into South Africa for its guerrilla insurgency. APLA arranged for passage through Botswana and with SWAPO through the Caprivi strip. In 1975, both Uganda and Libya assisted with military training. Between 1975 and 1976, after the FRELIMO victory in Mozambique, APLA insurgency activities increased along the South Africa-Swaziland border. Rural resistance against tribal authorities in northern Natal were harnessed to provide a potential base for APLA activities and a rural guerrilla movement. Members of the Mgomezulu community were trained in arms, 303 rifles and shotguns. They were however infiltrated and arrested by the Swazi police in April 1976.

Conditions in the military camps were harsh, with severe shortages of food provisions and medicine. A number of guerrillas suffered from tuberculosis. Political education from the texts of Marx, Lenin and Mao tse Tung formed part of the training. Refugee and exile conditions and deprivation thus tested the loyalty and commitment as well as the courage and fighting abilities of members of both liberation movements to the limit.

4.6.4 Awards during the liberation dtruggle

Over time, recognition for excellent service, bravery and outstanding contribution during the struggle years was given to deserving individuals.

The form of recognition and awards differed from time to time depending on the political, economic and social context. The two organisations within the liberation movement instituted at least two awards. The first one, namely, Isithwalandwe, is the highest and most prestigious award given by the ANC. This award was instituted in 1955 at the Congress of the People, where Trevor Huddelston, Albert Luthuli and Yusuf Dadoo were honoured. The second award, the Luthuli Medal of Honour, was re-instituted in 1993 and is the second award instituted by the ANC. There are currently six recipients of this award.

The PAC also instituted its own awards and two such awards are the Sobukwe Award, which is for both bravery and outstanding contribution to promoting unity, African emancipation and liberty. The second award instituted by the PAC is the Lembede Award for outstanding intellectual contribution during the fight against Apartheid and colonisation.

MK members form an active component of the newly-created South African National Defence Force, and recognition for deeds of bravery or meritorious service has been acknowledged through a series of awards for non-statutory forces.

The liberation movement operated largely under very difficult conditions of repression. As their activities took place underground, secrecy was often desirable to protect their members. In large measure, the criteria for nomination were spelled out by the highest decision-making body of the organisations. Although there were no written criteria, interviews suggest that the criteria included singular and outstanding acts of loyalty, bravery, unselfishness, and commitment to the idea of a free, non-racial and democratic future. As the organisations operated secretly, the details of the criteria were often agreed to verbally or orally.

4.6.5 Acts of bravery

Evidence presented to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and drawn from interviews, reveal the naked disregard for human rights and abuse by the Apartheid system/State and the commitment of thousands of activists of spite of the brutal conditions.

Under difficult and often impossible times, many within the liberation movements committed countless acts of bravery. From the defiance campaigns of the 1950s to the armed struggle in the 1960s to 1980s, one can list several hundred such acts. Within the MK Camp, the heroic deeds of the Luthuli Detachment and several acts of sabotage targeted at military installations and other symbols of white supremacy and Apartheid, can be considered courageous in the struggle to restore human rights and establish democracy.

The same can be equally said of several acts of bravery within the APLA Camp, the military wing of the PAC. At a personal level, even within the confines of prisons, among those sentenced for political acts and held at Robben Island, there are many acts of bravery which deserve mention. For example, the courage of refusal to obey unjust orders within the prison camps have been cited in interviews, as the following two quotes of incidents indicate:

Standing up to cruelty executed by prison wardens, a specific incident on behalf of President Mandela’s courage who stood up to the cruelty of prison wardens and protected the men who were following him on returning exhausted back from hard labour:

… soon after we started working … it was a minor thing but originally driven – prisoners are expected to run to and back from work – we had a fast pace – almost equivalent to running – in the first days of out stay on the Island … and we were returning back to the prison cells. Right in front was the President (Mandela) and three others - and the warden kept on shouting "Hak! Hak! Hak!" … and they ordered us to walk faster … however we just walked at our pace at that time they were still assaulting us … but I think because the President was in the first row they ere a bit more careful with us … So he was ordered (because he was in the front row) to move faster but he refused. He just walked at his own pace. They were then pushed from the back. We were in the second row. We were then ordered to move faster and still refused … and then they charged us for petty little things … my jacket button and things like that.

Unfortunately, as a result of this act, a more serious incident occurred on 28 May, a Friday night, when prisoners were forced by drunken wardens to strip naked in the freezing cold and line up against the wall:

… but then came a more serious event … May the 28^th – I will always remember that – it was a Friday – and they had come the wardens they had graded the criminals, prisoners – they were saying something…and they beat up a lot of them and they came to us, a Friday night. …don’t run… ordered us all to strip completely naked and stand against the wall … bitterly cold. Now we just had to keep … if one falls through there would have … because they were drunk and they were … for a fight, but as I say in our section they were very careful … but that night … Mbeki collapsed while they were still standing and we all thought that he has had a heart attack … they then allowed us to dress … but that was an incident in out section – you may find incidents of courage…

The liberation struggle also tested the loyalty of people to the extreme limits. Political prisoners were put together with criminals, and had to endure both difficulties from prisoners as well as wardens who regularly assaulted them. Even in the face of severe torture, they maintained their loyalty and did not reveal confidential information.

In one instance, a (prominent ANC leader) was severely assaulted and tortured - yet he did not talk , to an extent where he couldn’t take it anymore and he tried to kill himself. Now in jail - in a police cell – there is no instrument with which you can kill yourself. So he slashed his wrists with an egg shell. They never talked.

Others had to withstand torture at the hands of prison authorities.

(A prominent PAC leader) whilst working in the stone quarry had an altercation with a warder at the quarry. They then asked him to dig a hole and buried him up to the neck on a very hot day. When he asked for water, they urinated on him.

4.6.6 Symbolism of the awards

The four awards established by the liberation movement had symbolic significance during the fight against Apartheid. Of the four awards, only one was not named after a person.

These awards symbolised largely bravery and unselfishness, and the desire to get rid of what was seen as an illegitimate regime. For example, the Isithwalandwe Award, taken initially from the Xhosa traditions, symbolised prowess, endurance, courage and vision. In the case of Luthuli Medal of Honour, this symbolised commitment to excellence in leadership, exceptional community service and contribution to fighting against oppression. The Luthuli Medal was named after the Nobel Peace laureate and former President of the ANC, Albert Luthuli. The Luthuli Medal was instituted for exceptional acts of bravery in the liberation war, inspired by the celebrated and heroic success of the Luthuli detachment in MK.

The two awards instituted by the PAC also have symbolic significance: the Sobukwe Award, in honour of the first President of the PAC, and Lembede Award, in honour of exceptional intellectual contribution. As for the Sobukwe Award, recipients had to have committed acts of bravery, or contributed to a vision for African liberation and unity. The Lembede Award was given by the PAC to those who had made outstanding scholarly contributions which advanced African emancipation.

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1. Elphick, R., The Koisan to c.1770 in The shaping of South African Society, 1652-1820, Part 1.
   
2. Ibid
   
3. Ibid.
   
4. Newton-King, The Khoikhoi rebellion, Part 1.
   
5. Ibid.
   
6. Ibid.
   
7. Rubusana, W.B., Zemk’inkomo magwalandini (W.W. Gqoba: Umkhondo wamaGqunukhwebe). London, 1906,p.160. Yekela, D.S., The Life and Times of Kama Chungwa 1798-1875, MA Thesis, Rhodes University, 1988, abstract, preface and Chapter 1, pp. 4,7.
   
8. Maclennan , B., A Proper Degree of Terror: John Graham and the Cape’s Eastern Frontier, Ravan Press, 1986, pp.100-101.
   
9. T.S.Soga, Intlalo ka Xhosa, pp.22-23.
   
10. Ibid.
    
11. David Hammond-Tooke, The Roots of Black South Africa, Jonathan Ball Publishers, 1993, Chapter 1.
    
12. J.B. Peires, The Hose of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of their Independence, Ravan Press, 1981, Chapter 9.
    
13. J.H.Soga, AmaXosa Life and Customs, Lovedale Press, 1931, Chapter(iv).
    
14. Isithwalandwe is singular of amathwalandwe or izithwalandwe, the wearers of the blue crane feathers decoration.
    
15. T.B. Soga, Intlalo Ka Xhosa, Lovedale Press, pp. 137, 138.
    
16. Isinxiba mxhaga is a singular of one who wears umxhanga, the ivory arm band decoration.
    
17. Imixhaga is plural of umxhaga.
    
18. T.B. Soga, Intlalo Ka Xhosa, Lovedale Press, p. 138.
    
19. This horn was also used at marriage functions of the heir to the chief.
    
20. C.L. Harries, The Laws and Customs of the Bapedi, Johannesburg: Horton Ltd., 1929, p.83.
    
21. H.O. Monning, The Pedi, Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik, 1967, p. 294. For a detailed description of these practices, see Harries, The Laws, pp.114-5. For additional reading on warfare in pre-colonial South Africa, see also P. Becker, A Comparative Study of Strategy in Bantu Tribal Warfare during the 19th century, Military Journal of South Africa, vol.1, 1967-70; and I. Schapera, (ed.), The Bantu-Speaking Tribes of South Africa, Cape Town: Maskew Miller Ltd., 1966, pp.191-5.
    
22. See, for example, M.Wilson and L. Thompson, A History of South Africa to 1870, Cape Town: David Philip, 1982, p. 162; and H.O. Monning, The Structure of Lobedu Social and Political Organisation, African Studies, 22(2), 1963, p. 60.
    
23. Nemudzivhadi, M.H., The Conflict between Mphephu and the South. Nemudzivhadi, M.H., The Conflict between Mphephu and African Republic ca. 1895-1899, MA Thesis, chapter 1, 1977 Benso/Rau, The Independent Venda, Chapter 3, History, 1979.
    
24. Madau, E. in Van Warmelo. N.J., The Copper Miners of Musina and the Early History of the Zoutpansberg, 1940, pp. 10-32. Oral interview with David, Mainganyi Mufamadi, 4/8/98.
    
25. Wilson, M. & Thompson, L., ed., A History of South Africa to 1870, Part iv. Oraterview with David, Mainganyi Mufamadi, 4/8/98.
    
26. Lestrade, edited by Van Warmelo, Contributions towards Venda History, Religion,vol. 3.
    
27. Brenda Makhanda, Traditional Military Traits in Salut, March 1995, pp.32-35.
    
28. The South African Republic ca. 1895-1899, Beso/Rau, The Independent Venda, Chapter 3.
    
29. Benso/Rau, The Independent Venda, Chapter 3.
    
30. Ibid.
    
31. Mathatha Tsedu, Makhado sent Boers packing, in Sowetan, 5/3/1998.
    
32. See H. Barrell: MK: ANC’s Armed Struggle, London, Penguin Books, 1990; T. Motumi: Umkhonto we Sizwe – Structure, Training and Force Levels, African Defence Review, No. 18, August 1994.
    
33. See M. Motlhabi: The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid, Johannesburg, Skotaville Publishers, 1984; P. Kgosana: Lest we forget, Johannesburg.
    
34. See T.Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa 1945, Johhannesburg, Raven Press, 1983.